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and not by sight

0

n the covm this month a<e '<pmductions of two icons, painted, oe, in some moee
specifically accurate term "written" for our meditation. Part of an exhibition that we at Valpo have
enjoyed over the past weeks, they do indeed provide, as the exhibition's title suggests, a window
into eternity. Father Anthony Ugolnik writes in his introduction that though they are collected and
hung as though they were works of art, icons "are not meant as invitations to aesthetic appreciation
but rather as invitations to illuminative prayer. " In that spirit, The Cresset offers them as occasions
for meditation on the subject of this issue, Christian higher education, and the God who presumably stands behind their endeavors.
We no doubt recognize the subjects of both these images immediately. Formally, they are called
"The Transfiguration" and "The Incredulity of St. Thomas." Both put before us a moment when the
human and the divine come into contact, when the previously known becomes transformed by the
breaking in of a new vision. Both stories provide clear and rich instances of experiences from the
life of faith; both are as current as one's latest breath. When I hear these stories, I know that they
are my story. They make me laugh-wait, not because I take them lightly, but because they seem to
be about the profoundest truths I can get to, and thus they provoke a deep joy, the laugh that comes
caught up with tears.
In the story of the Transfiguration, the divine is present in Jesus, and eternity is present with
the figures of Elijah and Moses, God's earlier attempts at showing people what the Idea was. The
human-me, you-is present in Peter and the boys. It's a moment when flesh and blood tries to
imagine the unimaginable. The moment of the meeting is beyond what the most wise, the most
imaginative, the most sensitive and spiritually adept human could hope to comprehend. And instead
of the most wise, etc., here are these eager fishermen, trying hard, tagging along behind but working
to keep up, scratching their heads, rolling their eyes and wondering what in creation they've stumbled into. They are, as the icon shows us, upside down, no clue, thrown entirely outside the frame
of their experience. But Peter, our stand-in, dear Peter won't be entirely flummoxed. He knows that
he's experienced something beyond experience. So he wants to build a booth to keep it in, somewhere to fix it and study it and get it managed. Probably somewhere to worship, to express the awe
he feels, and to bring that awe under some kind of control. To repeat it and make it come when you
call. Oh, yes, I am right there with Peter in this story.
And then, we have the image of Thomas and his incredulity. Though of course, Thomas does
believe in something; he's not all un-belief. He believes in his own solid self, the evidence of his
senses, the reliability of his own responses. He believes in the deadness of dead. He knows the difference between truth and something you wish were the truth. Thomas has been grieving, and he
believes in that, too. Not in lugubrious gatherings that stir up the emotions of fearful paranoia, or
the mutual encouragement of sick fantasy that crowds induce. Thomas believes in serious, realistic
acceptance of the truth, and in the acknowledgement of loss and defeat. But, being reasonable and
not hostile, he can be prevailed on to give his friends a hearing; he is willing to put their wild-eyed
delusions to the test-the test of his own, measured, reasonable, grieving self. What he gets, of
course, is way outside the boundaries of tests as he has known them. He asks for an account, and he
gets the very living self of God, fully open to his intimate knowing. My Lord and My God!

Icons ask that you
look through them to
the Truth of God's
presence.
And the
church-related
college?

What is it that we contemplate in these icons? Surely we look into the opened side of God's body,
God's willingness to endure the scrutiny of the uncomprehending. We are invited to see the brightness
of glory and to hear the voice of unmistakeable identification, God's own voice naming God's own
Son in our midst. But of course in both stories we also look directly at the Scriptures' most blunt depiction of our own failings as believers. Here we confront not simply the sins of the stubborn outsiders,
the refusers and rejecters of God's will, but our truly amazing smallness and insuffiency as faithful
people.
And do we in the church-related schools read ourselves here? The icon demands not just that we
see the icon, but that we allow the icon to see us; there is a window here, remember. Have we been too
insistent on building our little booths in order to clutch at and control the transcendent? We too often
want to make our institutions into forms that are indistinguishable from every little food fair and
campground around us, as though the only models we could conceive of for engaging in the service of
the Truth were those a commercial world makes so appealing. Mindful of successes around us, we
make decisions based on asking our clients what they want, as if we were merely purveyors of product.
Do we attempt to manage our relation to the divine by keeping it tidily in its booth, (the Chapel program, for instance, or Student Life Offices) not letting it messily into our other affairs? We often seem
to fear letting real Truth really direct us, since we do have a sense that if we agreed to let ourselves
loose with Truth, we might be too small to deal with it. We might be blown right off the mountain.
Have we been demanding only reasonable tests to assure ourselves that we will not be fooled into
making the mistake of believing too much? Have we been too quick to accept the world's judgment
about the deadness of Jesus? Are our descriptions of what we want to see as proof about God's Truth
limited by what we have looked at in the past? Thomas asked to see just nail-marks in hands and feetsmall, manageable accounts of the Truth-and he got a much bigger picture. To his credit, he recognized it for what it was. Will we?
This issue of The Cresset contains rich material for examining the relation between Christian
learning through its own tradition, and through the gold of other religions. I hope that by enclosing
these pieces of writing within the covers of the icons, the meditations they provide will nourish and
shape your reading. Take time; eternity is the subject, after all.
Peace,

GME

1'-

Christians in the Visual Arts

is a national organization for Christians
working in all areas and styles of visual arts. For more information about CIVA, write to CIVA Membership, P.O. Box 18117, Minneapolis, MN 55418-0117, or call (508) 945-4026.
"Window into Eternity" will travel to Calvin College Center Art Gallery from September 1-30,
2000; then to Gallery Win Sacramento, CA from October 12 through November 17, and to North
Western College, Minnesota through December. It is available for travelling through 2001.
For information on this icon exhibit, or for sales/commisssions information on the cover iconographers, please contact Jerry L. Eisley, Director of the Washington Arts Group 202-363-2345 or foxhall@compuserve.com.
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Seeking Egyptian Gold:
a fundamental metaphor for the Christian intellectual
life in a religiously diverse age

Paul]. Griffiths

T . s essay attempts th<ee tasks. Ficst, it offm some obsecvations on the natme of lunda·
mental metaphors and their relation to the intellectual life. Second, it examines and partly explains
one such metaphor, drawn from the Christian past, and argues that this metaphor is peculiarly
appropriate as a guide and icon for parts of the intellectual life of individual Christians and Christian institutions as the third millennium begins. Third, it explores in a provisional way what the
acceptance and use of this metaphor might mean for Christian intellectual practice with respect to
the religiously alien.
the fundamental metaphor as icon
Every intellectual act presupposes and implies a purpose, a starting-point, and a proper
method. Specifying what these are is not a part of most intellectual acts. If you want to read a book,
for example, you'll be engaging in an intellectual act; but you'll be slowed to the stopping-point if,
before reading, you have to figure out and make explicit what it is to read, what reading is for, and
how it is best done. The same is true for acts of analysis, argument, writing, and so on. But the fact
that you don't need to specify, or even to be able to specify, the starting-point, purpose, and method
of your intellectual acts in order to undertake them doesn't mean that they are free from these elements; this they could only be if, per impossibile, they were situated beyond need of defense or justification on the strictly utopian and featureless plain of pure science; or if they were undertaken by
someone standing on an unlocated high point impossibly equidistant from all actual places. Neither
does it mean that some thought about the starting-point, purpose, and proper method of particular
intellectual acts is never desirable or useful. Quite the contrary. In certain situations, most especially
those in which it is no longer (or not yet) clear what particular intellectual acts are for, and so also
not clear how best to undertake them or from where to begin them, some such thought is essential.
Such thought, I suggest, will inevitably appeal to one or more fundamental metaphors.
To descend for a moment from the bracing but thin air of high abstraction, let me say just what
kinds of intellectual acts I'm here concerned with. I'm interested in Christian intellectual acts, which
is to say intellectual acts undertaken by Christian individuals or institutions who take these acts as
essentially related to their identity as Christians. Not just any Christian intellectual acts, though; I'm
here concerned only with those that take as their objects religiously alien phenomena: texts, people,
artifacts, or ideas. Specifying just what makes a phenomenon or an agent Christian isn't an easy
thing; it's just about equally difficult to say what makes a phenomenon or an agent religious. And it
might seem that a full-scale address to both questions is necessary for the purposes of this essay. But
fortunately it isn't. It would, no doubt, be nice to have a widely-agreed short list of necessary and
sufficient conditions for distinguishing Christian from non-Christian phenomena with as much precision as we can distinguish plants from animals (although, if there are any zoologists here, you'll

This essay was
originally presented
as a lecture for the
Lilly Fellows
Annual National
Conference,
held at Valparaiso
University
in October
of 1999.

know that there are genuine classificatory difficulties even on that matter); it would be equally nice
if we had such a short list for distinguishing religious from nonreligious things. But we have no such
short lists. For the purposes of the argument I'm about to offer, it will suffice for an intellectual act
to be understood as a Christian one taking as its object something religiously alien to Christianity
those who perform it understand it in that way.
Some examples of such acts. A contemporary Christian theologian reads and comments upon
Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhasyam, a Buddhist scholastic compendium composed in India in
about A.D. 400; a contemporary Christian observes, participates in, and attempts to understand a
ritual offering to Tara, a deity beloved by some Tibetan Buddhists; a Jesuit at an American Catholic
University teaches a class on Hindu theistic thought. In each case, a Christian engages intellectually
with a religiously alien object. This is the kind of intellectual act I mean.
You may object to the terminology, with Terence, that nothing human can be alien to you, and
that all Christians ought to think so, and therefore ought not to think of anything (much less anything religious) as alien. But what Terence meant by alienum and what I mean by 'alien' aren't the
same. I mean only that something is alien to you if it seems to you not explicitly to belong to what
you belong to in whatever respect is under discussion. So, Tony Blair is alien to Bill Clinton in
respect of citizenship; my Buddhist friends are alien to me in respect of religion; all women save one
are spousally alien to me; and many, many things are alien to (not explicitly part of) Christianity.
Now, acts of this kind, acts whereby Christians engage, intellectually, religiously alien things,
and do so explicitly as Christians, do stand in some need of clarification. We Christians do, at the
moment, need to devote some thought to what we're doing when we do this kind of thing (what it's
for, where it starts from, how it should best be done) because there's much evidence of uncertainty
about it. We are, that is to say, in a situation in which it's no longer (or not yet) clear what this intellectual act is for, or how and where to begin it. Christian institutions (churches, universities) do not
speak with a single voice about it; hence the debates about the significance of Christian identity for
what goes on in Christian institutions of higher learning, and about the importance that the study of
non-Christian religions should have in such places. Christian individuals are often unclear about it,
as well, as is evident in discussions about the nature and relevance of certain kinds of interfaith discussion and worship to the life of the body of Christ and its members, and about the extent to which
explicitly Christian assumptions do and should shape such things. These are hot topics just now,
and are likely to remain so; most discussion of them, though (even among Christians), takes place in
an atmosphere of resolute and ascetical renunciation of explicitly Christian talk, as though such talk
would infect beyond hope of cure any conclusions that might be reached. There are also those who
lament the passing of explicitly Christian ways of thinking and acting as formative of and central to
the intellectual life even of institutions that call themselves Christian; there are others who celebrate
this; and there are yet others who doubt whether there is, can be, or ever was such a thing as a
Christian intellectual act. (Recent books by Burtchaell, Marsden and Wainwright are good places to
see how these debates play out.)
Some light may be shed upon these debates, or so I think, by looking more closely at a fundamental metaphor that shapes and informs one way of approaching the matter, and this is the
metaphor of my title, the metaphor of seeking Egyptian gold. Applying this metaphor to our topic,
we have the view that when we Christians intellectually engage the religiously alien, what we do is
seek Egyptian gold.
I'll say more about how this metaphor has been used in a moment; first, though, some further
comment on what a metaphor is and what it might mean to call one 'fundamental.' I'll follow, for
the most part, the understanding of metaphor present in the work of the philosopher Donald
Davidson. According to Davidson, metaphors cannot be understood because they have no meaning;
this is so because only things with meaning can be understood. Instead of being treated as objects to
be understood, then, metaphors ought to be approached as linguistic artifacts that intimate, provoke, suggest, and stimulate. When I say Christian intellectual engagement with the religiously alien
is seeking Egyptian gold I speak metaphorically, which is perfectly compatible with my sentence
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meaning just what it says. Specifying the meaning of the sentence by offering a paraphrase of it (perhaps by attempting synonyms for 'Egyptian' and 'gold') would, if successful, produce a sentence
that means just what the original sentence means. Suppose I were to say Christian intellectual
engagement with the religiously alien is a searching for the malleable, ductile, yellow element possessed by the inhabitants of the country in North-Eastern Africa whose capital city is Cairo. Then,
leaving aside difficulties (deep though they are) about synonymy, I'd have produced a sentence that
means just what the original sentence meant. What both sentences mean is, of course, false; the
claim they make does not indicate a state of affairs that obtains. When I read Buddhist texts I'm not
seeking (and I don't find) any of the malleable, ductile, yellow element mentioned, and therefore
certainly none possessed by any Egyptian. When I understand, conceptually, the propositional content of our sentence, then, I'm dealing with its meaning, which is precisely not to deal with it as a
metaphor.
To deal with a sentence as a metaphor, in Davidson's language, is to understand metaphorical
speech as the "dreamwork of language"(245). Metaphor is a device that, like such things as dreams,
reveries, and soulful gazes into the eyes of the beloved, provides intimations and provokes a shift of
the gaze, a deeper noticing. It cannot be paraphrased. Dante, famously, doesn't tell us what the
gazes and the kiss exchanged by Francesca and Paolo meant; he notes only that these things interrupted their reading of the Arthurian romance, that they intimated and provoked something different, something more. So also with metaphors: as the gaze of the beloved provokes the kiss, which
in turn intimates the embrace, so the metaphor provokes a diversion of the attention from meaning,
and intimates a train of thought whose ending is unclear (eschatologically deferred, we might say, if
we're feeling theologically frisky); but its ending will almost always have little to do with what the
sentence that expresses the metaphor means. The idea, then, that a paraphrase of a metaphor's
meaning can be given is just the wrong idea. But this isn't to say that nothing at all can be said about
metaphors. Following Davidson again, analysis of metaphor proceeds best by paying attention to
the effects particular metaphors have on those who use them, to the patterns of action and thought
provoked or intimated by them.
And it is just here that Davidson makes an interesting move in his analysis of metaphor, the key
move for my purposes. The effects of any particular metaphor, like those of any particular joke or
dream, are, strictly, limitless. It is impossible to give an itemized and finite list of what any particular
metaphor intimates or provokes. Davidson says: "[I]n fact there is no limit to what a metaphor calls
to our attention, and much of what we are caused to notice is not propositional in character. When
we try to say what a metaphor 'means,' we soon realize there is no end to what we want to mention" (263). To think there is a finite number of particular nonmetaphorical claims intimated by a
particular metaphor is to fall back into a semantic construal of metaphor; it is, to use explicitly
Christian language, to make the gaze into the eyes of the beloved a gaze into the face of an idol
rather than the face of an icon, a gaze that freezes upon and exhausts that at which it looks. An icon,
like a metaphor, when properly understood and properly used, offers no representation, no image;
it is, rather, a visual device for shifting the gaze repeatedly away from all images, all representations,
and toward a closer union with that which is not an image and can never be represented. A failure
so to understand icons is what motivates iconoclasm; and a failure so to understand metaphors is
what motivates the desire, for instance, to purify the language of worship and prayer of metaphorical usage, to remove so-called crude and literalistic references to God's hands, feet, lips, and kisses,
to the milk of God's breasts and the sweet smell of God's breath. Iconoclastic and purificatory
desires of these sorts are mistaken (and damaging) precisely because they misunderstand what they
oppose, seeing idols where there may be icons. (I rely in this very sketchy account on works by JeanLuc Marion and Pavel Florensky.)
It is the great advantage of Davidson's understanding of metaphor (though not one he'd recognize) that it accords well with, and itself provides an iconic representation of, how Christians should
think about icons. But it is important to guard here against a possible misunderstanding of what I'm
suggesting about metaphors (and icons, though I'll now regretfully have to leave the latter aside). To

say that there is no limit to what a metaphor may intimate to or provoke in its users is not to say that
just anything may be intimated or provoked. What the metaphorical sentence nonmetaphorically
means constrains what it may evoke, even though there is no limit to what it may evoke. In similar
fashion, there is no limit to the series of natural numbers, but not just anything may enter that series.
Sentences, for example, may not.
Attention to a metaphor is, then, if I may be allowed to wax metaphorically poetical for a
moment, an action-provoking gaze into the eyes of the beloved. And, further, a metaphor becomes
fundamental if, in some sphere of action, it remains a constant presence, a provocation to which the
agent returns ever and again, a device that acts as a gently purring engine of intimation, always running, never turned off. I suggest that the metaphor of seeking Egyptian gold may be like this for
Christians in their intellectual engagements with the religiously alien, and that if it is, all sorts of
deeply interesting (and properly Christian) intellectual activities are intimated, provoked, and suggested. So much, then, for what a fundamental metaphor is.
seeking Egyptian gold in the Christian past
The past, as novelist L. P. Hartley wrote in The Go-Between, is a foreign country in which
things are done differently; and yet it's also a recognizable place, and a good one to wander in when
beginning to think about anything. It's especially good for Christians to begin there; for us, the
knowledge that we are surrounded always by a cloud of witnesses to Christ and the riches of Christ's
kingdom means that we would be foolish not to make a serious effort to consult and understand
what this cloud of witnesses has had to say about any matter of concern to us. Moreover, the question of how metaphorically to motivate or catalyze intellectual engagement with the religiously
alien is not a new one for Christians. Most often in the past it has arisen as a question about whether
and how Christians to ought read works of non-Christian philosophy or non-Christian literaturepagan works, as they were usually then called. These questions exercised Christians from the second
century onwards, and they are precisely an instance of the question I've raised, in spite of the deep
differences in the terms used for the religious other by Christians of that era and those preferred by
us-we tend not to call them 'pagans' or 'the heathen'-and they did not have at their disposal the
idea, so ordinary to us, that there is a plurality of religions.
This question was pressing for Christians between the first and the fifth centuries because they
were very aware of themselves as a beleaguered minority in a powerfully pagan setting. This is also
our situation, and in it serious thought about how to use the artifacts of the religiously alien is
unavoidable. The similarity between our situation and theirs is another reason why we ought to pay
attention to and learn from their response to their version of our question.
This is not to say, of course, that there was a single response on the part of Christians from the
period to the question of how (or whether) to read pagan literature. A quick sampling will show
that there was a wide range of opinion on the matter.
Tertullian, with a characteristically aggressive tone, has strong words to say in his De idololatria [On the Worship of Idols], composed in North Africa toward the end of the second century,
against schoolmasters [ludimagister], by which he means teachers of literature in general. (x.l) He
takes this to be an improper profession for Christians because it is almost inevitably idolatrous, and
he gives two reasons for thinking so. First, schools are unavoidably implicated with observance of
feasts and rituals belonging to pagan gods: it's usual, he says, for the feasts of Minerva and Saturn,
and for the calendrical festivals of the new year and of midwinter to be kept in schools, and these
are all instances of idolatry, deeply inappropriate for Christians. Second, and more damaging, the
works taught in these schools assume the reality of the pagan gods, and in teaching them the schoolmaster will almost inevitably give at least the appearance of doing the same: "Consider," says Tertullian, "whether the one who catechizes about idols isn't guilty of idolatry" [quaere an idololatrium
committat qui de idolis catechizat]-expecting the affirmative answer. (x.6) Tertullian does not
wish to place a ban upon the study of non-Christian literature by Christians. He acknowledges that
such study is a necessary condition for properly Christian learning. But Christians should treat it, he

sl9 The Cresset Trinity l2ooo

Special Issue Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts

says, as they would treat a poisoned drink: it may have benefits and attractions (of color and smell),
and these may properly be relished and used. But if you swill it down it will kill you. And, says Tertullian, the kind of limited use and delicate sipping proper to poisoned drinks is not possible for
professors of literature because they are swilling it around their mouths every day. Even for students
it is difficult not to swallow too much of the deadly brew.
Jerome, too, was extremely ambivalent about the pleasure he took in reading the non-Christian classics, both Latin and Greek. In a letter composed at Rome in the early 380s, in which he
commends virginity to Eustochium, a Roman lady, he compares reading non-Christian works
(specifically, Virgil and Cicero) to eating meat sacrificed to idols or drinking wine consecrated to
demons. (Epistula, 22.29). He describes to her in very vivid terms his own earlier addiction to the
pleasures of reading Cicero and Plautus. The elegant style of these Latin writers, he says, made it
difficult for him to take pleasure in the (comparatively) rude and repellent style of the prophets
(22.30). Eventually, while sick of a wasting fever, produced as he thinks by this addiction to mellifluous Latin prose, he has a dream-vision in which he comes before God's judgement-seat and is
asked who he is. He replies that he is a Christian, but God contradicts him and says that he is in fact
a follower of Cicero, for his heart lies with the treasures of Cicero rather than those of Christ.
Jerome thereupon takes an oath that he will never again possess or read worldly books, and that if
he does so this will amount to a denial of God [domine, si umquam habvero codices saeculares, si
legero, te negavi] (22.30).
This seems unambiguously negative and somewhat lacking in nuance: non-Christian books,
whether literary, religious, or philosophical, are nothing but a snare and a temptation. Reading
them brings no benefits and many dangers; it should therefore be avoided. Jerome's criticism of
worldly learning comes in the context of a letter recommending virginity: for him, the physical
adornments beloved by the sexually active and the intellectual adornments precious to the professionally thoughtful are of the same sort and have the same end, which is promiscuity.
But this unremittingly negative view of the benefits to Christians of reading non-Christian literature is not the only one defended in Jerome's letters. Later in his career he responds to a criticism
that he is himself too free with his quotations from and use of non-Christian literature and philosophy by listing and analyzing all the instances of the uses of non-Christian literature in Scripture,
from Solomon's use of philosophy in his compilation of the Book of Proverbs to Paul's use of a quotation from Aratus in Athens and his citation of a proverb from Epimenides to Titus. (70.1-2) What's
good enough for Scripture, he says, is good enough for me: there are proper uses of non-Christian
literature. He then uses the Deuteronomic regulations about marriage with women captured in war
to explain how these proper uses should be understood. These regulations permit such marriage,
but only after the woman's head has been shaved and her nails cut and she has spent a full month
living in mourning in an Israelite's house (70.2 re Deut. 21:10-14). Likewise with non-Christian
books: they may be read and used, but only for Christian purposes, and only after their former
identity has been stripped from them by placing them in a new context. And, of course, Christians
should read them not for their aesthetic and stylistic delights (represented by the captured woman's
hair and nails), but for their capacity to bear fruit in a Christian context (represented by the Jewish
children that the captured woman might bear to her captor). Jerome goes on to say that in fact most
of the books of non-Christian philosophers are "extremely full of erudition and philosophy" [eruditionis doctrinaeque plenissimi sunt] (70.6), which strongly implies that there are benefits to be had
from reading them that Christians should want.
Jerome and Tertullian both exhibit the deep difficulties which Christians in the Latin West
during the early centuries experienced in thinking about why and how non-Christian works should
be read. But other, more optimistic views are also voiced. Basil the Great, writing a letter of advice
to his nephews in about 3 70, discusses the profitable use of Greek (meaning, again, pagan) literature in some detail. For him, while pagan learning is always firmly subordinated to scriptural
learning, it is, nonetheless, of very great value. Pagan works, he says, are like the leaves on a fruit
tree: they are there to protect the fruit (which is the virtue provoked by scriptural learning), and so

are both ancillary and essential. Pagan writers often praise virtue, and when they do, Christians can
be prepared by attending to such praise for the deeper praises to be found in Scripture. For Basil,
the skopos or final aim of the Christian life is what all pagan learning serves, and this is fully realisable only by those who study Scripture; but a great store of wisdom suitable as a preparation for
such study can be had by reading pagan works.
Running like a thread through these discussions is attention to the fundamental metaphor of
seeking Egyptian gold. We will understand more deeply this metaphor by looking at its use by
Origen and Augustine.
In about the year 235, Origen wrote a letter from Cappadocia to his erstwhile pupil Gregory
(later to be called Thaumaturgus and to become bishop of Caesarea), who was then probably in
Egypt. The letter treats the proper uses of pagan, or philosophical, learning, something of which
Origen had a great deal, and which he used self-consciously throughout his theological writing.
Origen encourages Gregory to direct the whole force of his intelligence to the study and promulgation of Christianity (and most especially of the Bible), and to deploy whatever there is in Greek philosophy of use for that end. Philosophy, he says, ought to be understood as ancillary to (the handmaiden of) Christianity, of service principally for the end of understanding and interpreting Scripture better.
In explaining what this might mean Origen turns at once to Scripture (as, given his own
assumptions about how to do intellectual work as a Christian, he ought), and specifically to those
parts of the Book of Exodus in which the Israelites, still in slavery in Egypt, are instructed by God
(through Moses) to beg from the Egyptians objects of silver and gold, together with clothing, before
they depart. By this time the Egyptians are desperate to see the Israelites go, and press upon them
what they ask for. Later, after leaving Egypt, God instructs Moses to collect from the Israelites gold,
silver, bronze, and cloths and yarns of various sorts. These materials are then used to make and
ornament the ark of the covenant, the mercy-seat or propitiatory, the priestly vestments, and so
forth. But this is not the only use to which the Egyptian treasures are put: a similar request to the
people for materials (in this case gold only) is made by Aaron, and from what he gathers the golden
calf is made. (Origen refers to Ex. 3:22; 11:2; 12:35-36; 25:1-7; 32:1-4; 35:4-9; 35:20-29.)
This might not seem to be the biblical story with the most immediate promise for explaining
whether and how Christians ought read non-Christian philosophical works. But Origen uses it to
dramatic effect, focussing his interpretation on the phrase "despoiling the Egyptians" which is used
in Exodus to summarise what happens when the Israelites leave Egypt laden with treasure. This
treasure, says Origen, is indeed treasure, but it is treasure whose proper use was not known to the
Egyptians; only the Israelites, guided by God's wisdom, could know that the Egyptian gold should
be used to make objects devoted to the worship ofYHWH. But Origen goes on to say that Egyptian
gold is a dangerous thing: it can be used to ornament the worship ofYHWH, but it can also be used
to create idols. Spending time in Egypt is dangerous, and is more likely to lead to idolatry than to a
proper augmentation and ornamentation of YHWH's worship, and Origen, though with a little
confusion of the account of Hadad the Edomite, tells the story of Jeroboam's use of Egyptian gold
to illustrate this.
For Origen, then, Egyptian gold stands for philosophical learning (which he usually calls Greek
learning). Sometimes such learning can be a useful handmaiden to Christian intellectual enterprises.
But all too often, he thinks, it is not. He says that there are those
who, from their Greek studies, produce heretical notions [hairetika noemata], and set them up,
like the golden calf, in Bethel, which signifies Gods house. In these words also there seems to me
an indication that they have set up their own imaginations [ta idia anaplasmata] in the Scriptures where the word of God dwells. (Pros. Gregorion, col. 89)
Reading non-Christian works, whether philosophical or religious, is, on this view, likely to lead to
the importation of ideas incompatible with the Scriptures, and to the interpretation of the Scriptures through those ideas. (Some would say that Origen himself was guilty of just such a mistake.)
But this is not an inevitable result; Origen's letter ends with a passionate recommendation to Gre-
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gory that he apply himself diligently to the study and proper interpretation of the Scriptures, but
Origen does not take back his opening instruction that Gregory should "extract from the philosophy of the Greeks what may serve as a course of study or preparation for Christianity" (col. 86).
Egyptian gold is dangerous treasure, but it is still treasure, still of use for developing a proper understanding of what it is that the Scriptures witness to. It should therefore be sought and applied with
wary eagerness.
It seems, from Origen's use of the metaphor of Egyptian gold, that pagan philosophy-and, by
extension, non-Christian religious wisdom-is something that Christians lack and need. Without it,
the ark of the covenant cannot be adequately ornamented; with it, God's commands can be followed and his intentions realized. But Egyptian gold is something the proper use of which is
unknown to the Egyptians. In order to be used as God wishes, it must be taken from the Egyptians
and used in a new (and perhaps unrecognizably different) context. Imagine a young child fascinated
by the beauty of a gold coin and happy to play with it for hours, but completely without understanding of the fact that it can be used to buy clothes to warm his nakedness, or food to nourish a
starving man, or incense for the worship of God. An adult who takes the coin from him to use it for
one or another of these purposes is perhaps doing what Origen recommends to Christians: taking
something needed, something beautiful and good and true, from someone who cannot understand
its proper meaning and purpose, and then putting it to proper use.
Origen's method is instructive. A question is raised: should we read pagan literature, and if we
should, with what purpose and using what method? He turns to Scripture to find a fundamental
metaphor to set his thought on the question going. Or, we might say, he gazes at the face of the
beloved as imperfectly reflected in the iconic words of Scripture, and in the trace of God found
there his thoughts are set moving on a particular track. The dreamwork done for Origen by the
Egyptian gold metaphor issues, for him, in some particular conclusions, just sketched, in response
to the question raised. But these conclusions are not determined by the metaphor. They couldn't be
if I'm right that metaphors don't have any meaning other than that given by what they explicitly say.
For conclusions would only be determined by a metaphor if metaphors were meaning-bearers. Since
they aren't, since they're more like icons, they suggest or intimate possibilities for thought, and one
such possibility is evident in Origen's letter to Gregory. But it is not the only possibility, as can easily
be seen by turning to the use Augustine makes of the same metaphor.
Augustine, writing almost two hundred years later than Origen, also makes use of the metaphor
of Egyptian gold for non-Christian wisdom. In his work De doctrina christiana (On Christian Doctrine), begun in 396-97 and revised and completed in 426-427, he provides rules for the proper
interpretation of Scripture, and for the effective communication of its meaning to others-in effect,
a complete program in Christian education whose central focus is Scripture. In one part of this
work he discusses whether Christians should study secular disciplines and read non-Christian literary works, and if so, how they should do so. (ii. 27-ii.63) The leitmotif of his discussion is that
secular disciplines and non-Christian literary works should be used by Christians just in so far as
they help in gaining understanding of Scripture. Christians should not fear these things just because
they were developed for non-Christian purposes: After all, he says, it is no reason for us not to learn
our letters, just because they say Mercury is their patron god [quia earum repertorem dicunt esse
Mercurium] (ii.28). Truth may be found outside Scripture and outside the Church, and wherever it
is found it belongs to God and should be acknowledged as such by Christians.
It is principally when he comes to consider the value of philosophy for Christians that Augustine takes up the metaphor of Egyptian gold. He begins by acknowledging that philosophers, especially Platonists, have said many true things, and that Christians ought to acknowledge this because
on some matters what Platonists teach and what Christian doctrine prescribes are not different
(11.60). It is important to notice that this way of putting things strongly suggests that pagan philosophy doesn't teach any truths unknown to Christians. But Augustine immediately goes on to say
that when Christians do find truths taught in Platonist works, they should claim them for their own
use, just as the people of Israel appropriated the gold and silver of the Egyptians. But there is a dis-

analogy here: if Christians already teach and know all the truths that Platonists teach, what does it
mean to claim them? In the case of the Egyptian gold, the whole point of the story (and the
metaphor) is to say that the Egyptians have something the Israelites lack and need, but Augustine's
interpretatior: of the metaphor seems to suggest only that the Egyptians have something good and
true that Christians already possess.
There is perhaps an ambiguity in Augustine's thought here. But on balance I think his view is
close to Origen's on this particular point. In his fullest statement on the matter he says:
[T]heir [the pagans'] teachings also contain liberal disciplines which are more suited to the service of the truth, as well as a number of most useful ethical principles; also, some true things are
to be found [nonnulla vera inveniuntur] among them about worshiping only the one God. All
this is like their gold and silver, which is not something they instituted themselves but something
which they mined, so to say, from the ore of divine providence which has been paid down everywhere [quasi metal/is divinae providentiae, quae ubique infusa est, eruerunt]. As they for their
part make perverse and unjust misuse of it in the service of demons, so Christians for theirs
ought, when they separate themselves in spirit from their hapless company, to take these things
away from them for the proper use of preaching the gospel. Their fine raiment too, meaning,
that is, what are indeed their human institutions, but still ones that are suitable for human
society [hominum quidem instituta sed tamen adcommodata humanae societati], which we
cannot do without in this life, are things that it will be lawful to take over and convert to Christian use. (ii.60)

This way of putting things implies, even if it does not quite say, that the"useful ethical principles"
and the "institutions suitable for human society which we cannot do without in this life" are needed
and not already possessed by Christians. And Augustine immediately follows this paragraph with a
dithyramb of praise to those Christian thinkers (Cyprian, Lactantius, Victorious, Hilary, and
including Moses) who have been crammed with but not seduced by "what came out of Egypt."
Egyptian gold is therefore not only a good thing for Christians, but also an essential thing.
But Augustine cannot leave matters at that point. Concerned, apparently, that his readers and
hearers might think that he has placed too high a value on Egyptian gold, he ends his discussion of
the topic by re-emphasizing that all the "knowledge derived from the books of the pagans"
[ cuncta scientia ... collecta de libris gentium], is of minor significance when compared to the knowledge derived from Scripture, and that, using an elegantly aphoristic formula, "whatever one might
find outside [the Scriptures] is if harmful condemned there and if useful found there" [nam quidquid
homo extra didicerit, si noxium est, ibi damnatur; si utile est, ibi invenitur]. (ii.63) Once again the
tension is evident: Augustine gives with one hand and takes back at once with the other. He wants
to say that the Egyptians have gold lacked and needed by Christians, but as soon as this is said-or
at least strongly implied-he takes it back and says that Christians already have all the gold to be
found in Egypt.
If this latter position is the correct one, the question of why Christians should interest themselves in Egyptian gold remains unanswered. The only attempt to answer it in De doctrina christiana
is the suggestion that the Egyptians have stolen what conceptual treasures they have from Christians, and that Christians are interested in them only because they want to get back what is rightfully theirs. Augustine mentions a story that Plato travelled to Egypt at the time of Jeremiah, when
that prophet was in exile there, and learned what truths he knew by a study of Jeremiah's work
(ii.43); and he also often speaks of claiming back from the Egyptians the truths they teach, as from
unjust possessors of stolen property. The Plato/] eremiah story is, of course, almost certain to be
mistaken historically, and it stands uneasily with Augustine's (and Origen's) use of Exodus as the
basis for the Egyptian gold metaphor, since there is no suggestion in that book that the gold and
silver received by the Israelites had been stolen from them; it is, rather, a proper possession of the
Egyptians, given (under some duress) to the Israelites. Augustine himself shows some uneasiness
about the theft idea, (for instance in Retractiones ii.4) and uses it, I suspect, as a relatively unconsidered polemical response to accusations from Platonists that anything good in Scripture is an ille12113 The Cresset Trinity l2000 Special Issue Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts

gitimate borrowing from Plato. The theft motif will, in any case, be of no use in considering what
Christians might think about the gold of the Buddhists or the Confucians, since no one can reasonably suggest that anything true and good in Buddhism has been stolen from Christian texts.
The thoughts intimated to Origen by the Egyptian gold metaphor are not identical with those
intimated to Augustine by the same metaphor. They differ in level of interest in determining how
the Egyptians came by the gold in the first place, as well as in what to say about just how Christians
should use the gold if they can get their hands on it. This is what we'd expect. If metaphors don't
mean but evoke, there'll be considerable variation in what they evoke. But there is also considerable
similarity in the direction in which Augustine's and Origen's thoughts are pushed by the metaphor
as given in its biblical context. They both assume that there is something precious which Christians
must have in order to fulfil their God-given mission, and they are both prepared at least to entertain
the possibility that Christians can get it from no other source than the Egyptians. They agree, too, in
the thought that Christians should want these precious things, this Egyptian gold, only in order to
bring to fruition their own mission. Any other motivation or goal would be destructive, damnable,
idolatrous. And so they agree, too, that precious though the gold is, it can be used in at least two
ways: to make golden calves, or to ornament the ark of the covenant. There is, for both of them,
danger and promise in the gold of the Egyptians, the possibility of learning what God wants to be
known as well as the possibility of creating an intellectual idol that shuts God out. They differ,
though, in their assessment of the proper relative weights of the danger and the promise. Origen,
although he notes the danger, is not much troubled by it (and in this he represents a trajectory of
thought developed most fully by the Cappadocians, especially Basil the Great). But Augustine has a
deep worry about the perils of overestimating the value of Egyptian gold, a worry that leads to the
tensions in his thought that I've noted.
So much for the uses of the Egyptian gold metaphor by the Fathers (though what I've said has
no more than scratched the surface of the topic). What, now, might we do with this metaphor as an
icon suggestive of ways to engage, intellectually, the religiously alien?
seeking Egyptian gold today
The early years of the third millennium are not the early years of the first. Much is different,
and contemporary Christian practices used to engage the religiously alien intellectually cannot
simply reproduce those used for that purpose in the first centuries. But the differences do not go so
deep that the metaphor of seeking Egyptian gold has ceased to have the power to function metaphorically or iconically for us. It is not a dead metaphor, even if it is largely a forgotten one.
If it is to be recovered, it must be gazed on with the serious devotion given to an icon. Part of
this gazing will involve attention to the uses made of the metaphor by Christians in the past. But
turns to the past can't be merely antiquarian if the metaphor is to be iconic for us. This is because
antiquarians are interested in idols that can be placed in museums, while Christians are interested
always in the intellectual service of the living God. And so the turn to the past is, for us now, an
essential part (but only a part) of permitting the metaphor to work on our thought and our practice
by intimation and evocation.
What, then, might a contemporary tradition-informed gaze at the metaphor we've been considering intimate to us about our contemporary Christian practices of engaging the religiously alien?
First intimation: the gold of the Egyptians is precious, desirable, to be sought with eagerness.
We are therefore motivated to grapple with, to probe, to explore, and to ingest, the particulars of
the religiously alien in all their alien specificity, because it is precisely in those specificities that we
will find-if we can find-the precious things we seek, even though we don't know as we seek them
just what they are or what we'll do with them when we've found them. Christians, both individuals
and institutions, might therefore be moved powerfully by the metaphor toward deep engagement
with the particularities of the religiously alien. This is not something optional for or ancillary to the
intellectual life of contemporary Christians. Meditation upon the biblical roots of the metaphor will
reinforce this view. The Israelites, as they left Egypt, were commanded by God to seek Egyptian

gold, even though they did not then know what it was to be used for. It was not enough for them to
follow the leadership of Moses into the wilderness under the hand of YHWH. They needed, also,
something from the alien.
This first intimation evokes, then, the need for deep engagement with alien specificity. But
what might this mean? I can make only some brief suggestions here, without any pretense to exhaustiveness. The first is the possibility and desirability of radical textual engagement with the religiously alien, the possibility and desirability of a deep reading of the works the Egyptians-the Buddhists, the Muslims, the Hindus-have written and spoken. Such a deep textual engagement is
hardly practised by Christian individuals or institutions today. This is mostly because we think we
know what we'll find in the literary works of the religious alien, and so we find ourselves disinclined to make the effort to look closely. Theological conservatives tend to think that they'll find a
tissue of error and idolatry, and so they don't look at particulars. Theological liberals tend to think
that they'll find lots of what Christians already know-which is true and good, of course-and so
they don't bother to look, either. But Christians motivated by intimations of as-yet-undreamed-of
gold to be found among alien works will not think either of these things. Instead, they'll go digging,
with serious sweat.
A paradigmatic product of such sweaty exertion, and one noticeable by its absence in the contemporary Christian world, would be the commentary. Christians have always displayed the riches
of their deep reading, their properly religious reading, in the literary genre of the commentary, most
likely because this genre, more than all others, is the natural product of radical textual engagement.
It, more than any other, takes the details of what is read (rhetorical, linguistic, conceptual, theological, analogical, anagogical, and so on) seriously and finds them worthy of explication. Christian
history, of course, is filled with Scriptural commentary; it has also, at certain periods, been filled
with commentary upon alien works, upon Virgil, for example, or Aristotle; but it has, with rather
few exceptions (I think of Nicholas of Cusa's work on the Qu'ran ) not offered much in the way of
commentary upon the literary gold of the religiously alien. Where are the contemporary Christian
commentaries on the massive and fascinating works of Buddhist scholasticism produced in India
and Tibet? Where the commentaries upon the Islamic Hadith, or the devotional hymns of the Alvars,
or the alchemical works of religious Taoism? Christians have, it seems, neither the intellectual
energy or the interest to do the work to produce such artifacts. Constant attention to the guiding
metaphor of Egyptian gold might help us to recover both, and to show our recovery in how we
teach what is religiously alien in our schools, universities, and seminaries.
The fact that we do not, as Christians, engage in deep reading of this sort is largely because we
are captive to the wrong metaphors, metaphors that have no roots in the Christian past, and no
properly Christian resonance. How many of us, for instance, are captive still, even if half
unknowing, to the Weberian hochwissenschaftliche understanding of the vocation of intellectual
work as an iron cage that radically separates fact and value, and does so precisely in its attempt to
make of theology something that is not properly an intellectual discipline at all? (I'm thinking especially of Weber in "Wissenschaft als Beruf. ") This fundamental metaphor is compatible with certain
sorts of deep reading (though not with Christian deep reading), and the sad irony is that textual
engagements with the works of the religious alien that I have in mind have, in recent centuries,
almost always been done in this Weberian mode and as a result have yielded no gold of any use
whatever for the ornamentation of the body of Christ. Again, attention of the right sort to the right
metaphors will help.
Deep engagement with specificity need not, however, be only textual-commentarial in its
mode. It may also be concerned with modes of action, at the institutional or the individual level.
Here there are many possibilities, too, but most of these are possibilities not for the university but
for the Church. For example, I expect that a deep and respectful exposure to practices used by the
religious alien to transmit the faith across generations in a deeply inhospitable cultural setting like
that of twenty-first century America would yield gold of an especially bright and decorative sort.
But in addition to this first intimation, the intimation of preciousness and desirability, there is
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a second intimation: the gold of the Egyptians is beautiful, and therefore dangerously seductive.
This is why the Fathers had (and why we should also have) such a deeply ambivalent attitude to all
intellectual enterprises that pretend independence. They are beautiful, and what is beautiful may
always lead us to value it for itself and not for its relation to the God of Abraham, Moses, and Jesus.
The Israelites, recall, used the gold of the Egyptians to make a golden calf before they used it to
ornament the ark of the covenant. Bearing this intimation in mind, holding it constantly before us
as something evocative, should lead Christians doing the kind of serious work on the religiously
alien just outlined, always to bear in mind what they are doing it for. They are doing it-to use a different but equally evocative metaphor-to annotate the sacred page of Scripture, to enrich our
understanding of what God has given us and to permit us better to serve and respond to the God
who has given it to us. No other goal is, finally, of any interest at all to Christian intellectuals, and
that this is so will make what Christians produce when reading the works of the religious alien with
the attention they require deeply different from what Weberian intellectuals produce. A Christian
commentary upon the Qu'ran or the Lotus Sutra, for instance, will be different in essential respects
from one produced by a Weberian intellectual. It will be a work produced out of love for God and
as an act of service to the body of Christ, and this will be evident in at least the subtext of every line.
Showing in detail what this might mean can't be done today; it must, in fact, await the development
of a tradition of doing what hasn't yet been done, which is approaching the gold of the Egyptians,
the treasure of the religious alien, simultaneously as something precious that is desperately needed
and as something dangerous always to be submitted to and constrained by an authority beyond
itself.
It's only in self-conscious submission to the ambivalent metaphor of Egyptian gold, in an attitude of wary receptiveness to the intimations of that icon, that Christians can begin to do the work
that needs to be done on the religious alien. And since there's a great deal of work to be done, I
hope that more of us will soon adopt just such an attitude.
I'll conclude with a brief consideration of two possible objections to the line taken in this talk.
According to the first, thinking in the way I've suggested about the Egyptians is theologically problematic because it calls into question the centrality and all-sufficiency of God's self-revelation in
Christ. Hasn't God, it might be argued, already given us all we need to know? How can the Church
need to learn about its concerns from those who do not know Christ? Shouldn't Christians be the
teachers of religious aliens rather than their students? Such an objection, I think, is misconceived. It
is certainly true that God's self-revelation in Christ is complete in the sense that only in Christ was
God fully present to humans. The doctrine of the incarnation, coupled with its entailment, which is
a properly trinitarian theism, requires us to say this. But saying, for example, what the Nicene Creed
says about the Holy Trinity is perfectly compatible with the claim that the Church has not yet completed its theological task. Indeed, the claim that the body of Christ does not yet know all it needs to
know about God's relations to and intentions for human beings is, I think, also required of Christians, for reasons that include a properly-developed doctrine of sin and an understanding of the history of salvation. Further, it is obvious from the history of God's dealings with His chosen people,
both Christians and Jews, that those chosen and used by God to educate and chastise His chosen
ones are often not of them. Consider Cyrus. Acknowledging that the Egyptians may have treasures
we need is not only intellectually productive, but also an exercise of the complementary Christian
virtues of confidence and humility: confidence that we will, with God's guidance, know better what
to do with the gold we find than the Egyptians who already have it, and humility before the fact that
God has chosen to use the hands and minds of the religious alien to give us treasures we do not yet
have.
A second objection, from the other side, as it were, is that to speak and think of faithful Buddhists, Muslims, and so forth as Egyptians, aliens whose treasures we may plunder, is redolent of an
entirely unacceptable imperialism of both an intellectual and (perhaps) a political sort. This is a
complex objection because it contains both ethical and practical assumptions; I can't fully address it
here. I'll sketch the beginnings of a response by noting two things. First, attention to the intimations
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of the metaphor of seeking Egyptian gold suggests that what the religious alien actually says and is
really about are deeply important matters; the bland assurance of the anti-imperialist does no such
thing, and in this respect, among others, is, in a possibly paradoxical way, much less respectful of
the alien's particularity. Second, seeking Egyptian gold is, as a Christian act, to be framed and constrained always by the demands of caritas, of Christian love; this acts, or should act, as a constraint
upon the arrogance and violence of imperalists. As Bonaventure says, " ... hie est fructus omnium scientarum, ut in omnibus aedificetur fides, honorificetur Deus." And if that honor really is the fruit
aimed at by deep reading of the religious alien, worries about imperialism ought not to be very high
on the list of our difficulties.
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The Role of Story Telling_in
Interreligious -Dialogue
Antonie Wessels

I

want to discuss with you some of the concerns we all face as we attempt to educate the next
generation into our faith traditions, since these concerns are common to all faith communities in
multicultural, multireligious-and often a-religious-societies.
We know that many of the younger generation are not very impressed by the face of religion
(be it Christianity or Islam) shown to them in our time. At the very least, there is need for greater
and deeper information. Some years ago, speaking to an audience of students about the relationship
between.Jews, Christians and Muslims, I referred to the different sons of Abraham, and a student
raised her hand to ask, "Who is Abraham?" A Belgian writer has told of the time when, driving
with her duaghter past a church where a cruciifix hung, the daughter asked her, "Who is hanging
there, Mom?" We may in fact need a kind of "deconstruction" of mutual ignorance or false information about religious traditions as a starting point. But I would like to focus on one feature of religious life which I believe holds great promise for inter-cultural and interreligious understanding.
story telling in general: why tell stories?
After all, the different religious communities are communities in which stories are told.
The plot of a story links the cultural horizon of the teller with the hearers. It invites participation in
the fundamental discussion about your own life. The plot of a story lets the listener work with the
sentiments it recites, and connects the listeners with the progress of the story, perhaps the great
story told in connection with a larger story of the community itself.
Telling stories builds up a community. Building stones for the continuation of the story-telling
community in new situations, new cultures, new times. Each story communicates the norms and
values which the story teller finds of significance for the continuation of the community which he
hopes for his children. Each story recreates the community again by referring to the fundamental
truths of the community through suitable feelings and responses.
How do we learn from stories? I would list these five things that stories teach: that life is full of
contradictions; that surprise is to be found in common things; that inner life can always be richer;
that something new lies ahead, and that possibility is greater than we expect. Beyond these, stories
contribute to the maintaining and testing and improvement of the democratic community wherein
we live. And finally, telling and hearing stories counterbalances social isolation and disintegration.
Fostering sensitivity to a world of symbols, stories give us capacity to sensitively probe into new
areas of reality and thus can make people also more sensitive for the symbols of people of different
cultures and traditions.
All religious traditions have examples of great figures who contributed their stories in response
to the challenges of their time. After the fall of Rome, the question arose: "Is this the end of civilization and the conquest of barbarism?" In response, St. Augustine wrote De Civitate Dei (On the
City of God). In the Muslim tradition, recall the example the mystic, Jalal al-Din al-Rumi or
Mawlana, "our master" as the Muslims call him. He wrote his collection of very inspiring stories,
Mathnawi, after the fall of one of the great cultural centers of the world, Baghdad, in 1258.
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Or we might mention a recent example of Seamus Heaney, who writes of a new Ireland beyond the
"troubles." His story gives courage and hope to an embattled people.
Perhaps we have to tell stories in a more modest way than it often happened in the past. And
since they are often not even limited to a particular culture or religion, are widely understandable
and communicatable and translatable or actually are in a way already translated, stories can help us
to learn to live in a multicultural society. Because the elements of story can illuminate the key ideas
in a tradition, they help us to understand a different religion more readily than does a comparative
study of specific pronouncements or dogmas.
Now what I intend to do is to reflect with you in more depth on one particular story taken
from the Qur'an which is elaborated later on in the Muslim mystical tradition, so rich in story
telling. I would like to give one example of such a story, found in chapter (Sura) 18 of the Qur'an,
the story of Moses and his servant meeting with a stranger. What is so interesting and important
about this story?
where does it come from?
Let me make clear at the outset that when I ask about the sources of this story, I am not
intending to say that this particular Qur'anic story is not original or that Mohammed is committing
plagiarism. Throughout history people are always telling and retelling stories and in so doing influencing each other and being influenced by the other all the time. One might take as an example the
sufi story about Jesus: One day Jesus is walking with his disciples and comes across a dead dog. The
disciples said: "Oh! he is stinking!" Whereupon Jesus said: "Look how beautiful his teeth are."
This story is, for instance, also told about the Buddha!
To further describe some instances of re-use and borrowing of story materials, let me refer to
two that are well-known to Western literature, Cervantes and James Joyce. The famous author of
Don Quixote lived in a turbulent time like ours. Wounded in 1571 in the sea-battle of Lepanto as
the Spanish-Venetian Papal fleet engaged the Ottoman Turks, who had hoped to destroy Christian
power, Cervantes became known in Spain as el manco de Lepanto: the one-handed one of Lepanto.
He was not a "new Christian," as it was called, i.e. he was a convert from Judaism! The book of
"the knight-errant with the sad face," fighting against windmills, is often read superficially. But a
careful reading of the novel reveals the mainspring of the book's extraordinary power. It is the first
instance in popular literature of the profoundly religious theme of victory plucked from defeat,
which has strong Christian implications. The Don, courteous and chivalrous toward those who ill
use him, and ready to help the distressed and attack tyranny or cruelty at whatever cost to himself,
is manifestly a greater man than the dull-witted peasants and cruel nobles who torment and despise
him. We love him, because his folly is Christ-like, his victory is not of this world.
What is my point here? Cervantes claimed that his novel which was supposed to end all knight
tales, his Don Quixote, is not just a knightly story but a tale copied from an Arab historian! In Cervantes' time Arabic was still spoken in Spain, for only in 1614 were the last Moriscos driven out of
Spain. Therefore it could have sounded credible for his contemporaries that the original Don
Quixote was the work of a Moor, a historiographer called Sidi Hamet ben Engeli, and was original
ly written in Arabic. Though this assertion is not literally true, Cervantes certainly owes much to
Andalusian culture. Actually Cervantes defended the ideals of the humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam
in a time when the ideals of a multi-cultural society (the famous symbiosis in Spain) were coming to
an end.
Another example from the beginning of our century is the Irish writer James Joyce. He is not
committing plagiarism when he in his Ulysses follows the structure of the Homer's Odyssey. Rather,
setting the tale of the wandering man during one day and in one place, he both particularizes and
universalizes the original story. Leopold Bloom-the Ulysses of the Book-is a wandering Dublin
Jew, while Stephen Dedalus-the Telemachus of the book-is the Dublin poet, a Telemachus in
search for the wandering father. Joyce implies that life and time are continuous and the heroic wanderings of Ulysses are re-enacted in the unheroic wanderings of men upon the face of the earth in
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our times, that life is made up of recurring cycles, that birth, life and death are surrounded by legends that grow out of the life-and death process, past and present as well as future, and that these
cycles occur in the vastness of eternity. So I hope these two examples indicate my contention that
the use of prior materials does not diminish the significante of the later work, but quite the contrary.
the story of the Khidr, the Green Man
In the 18th chapter of the Qur'an, called "the cave"(verses 59-81), one finds the story about
the meeting of Moses with a stranger. The outline is as follows:
Moses (or Musa) goes with his servant on a journey, the goal of which is the meeting of the two
seas. But when they reach this spot, they find that the fish which they had brought with them for a
meal has found its way into the water and swum away! While looking for the fish, the two travellers
meet a servant of God. Moses wants to follow this unnamed stranger to see if he will teach him the
right path. They come to an arrangement but the servant of God tells him at the outset that though
Moses will not understand what he will be doing, he must not ask for explanations.
They set out on the journey during which the servant of God does a number of outrageous
things. First the stranger drills a hole in the boat of some poor fishermen, so that they cannot go out
to fetch their daily catch. Then he comes to a place where he and Moses are graciously invited into
some people's house, but the next morning he kills their young son. Third, he comes to a place
where people are rude to both of them, but yet he helps them build a wall. Moses loses patience so
that he cannot refrain from asking for an explanation, whereupon the servant of God replies: Did I
not tell you that you would be lacking in patience with me? At all three points Moses cannot contain himself; he protests and demands an explanation. But this is contrary to the deal which he has
made with the stranger. The stranger finally leaves Musa and on departing gives him the explanation of his actions, for each of which he has some good (?) reasons.
Now when we ask about the origins of this story, we will get some fruitful answers.The
Qur'anic story may be traced back to three main sources: the Gilgamesh epic, the Alexander
romance, and the Jewish legend of Elijah and Rabbi Joshua ben Levi. Let us take each of these and
.look for the similarities.
Overcome with melancholy at the death of his friend Engidu, Gilgamesh, the great hero of
ancient Mesopotamia, discovers that every living thing must die. In order to learn from him the
secret of immortality, Gilgamish resolves to seek out the wise old man of his time: Ut-napishtim,
who has been given eternal life and who lives at the mouth of the rivers on an island across the sea
of Death. Gilgamesh wants to ask him about the plant of life which will rescue man from the power
of death. Gilgamesh passed alone and at the shore of the sea where a mysterious female received
him with the following lines:

0 Gilgamesh, whither do you fare?
The life you seek, you will not find.
When the gods created man,
They apportioned death to mankind;
And retained life to themselves.

0, Gilgamesh, fill your belly,
Make merry, day and night;
Make each day a festival of joy,
Dance and play, day and night!
Let your raiment be kept clean,
Your head washed, body bathed.
Pay heed to the little one, holding onto your hand,
Let your wife delight your heart.
For in this is the portion of man.
Gilgamesh insisted on his quest; and the woman sent him on to the ferryman of death, who
would bring him across the cosmic sea to the island of the blessed, where the ever-living Utnapishtim dwelt, together with his wife. The ageless couple received the voyager, let him sleep for

six days and nights, fed him magic food, washed him with healing waters and told of the plant of
immortality at the bottom of the cosmic sea, which he must pluck if he would live, as he desired,
forever. And so, once again, in the boat of the ferryman of death, Gilgamesh voyaged as no one ever
before him. "The plant is like a buckthorn," Ut-napishtim told him, "Its thorns will tear your hands,
but if your hands can pluck it, you gain new life." Gilgamesh is able to do so. But when he had
landed and was on his way, he paused for the night; and when he went to bathe, a serpent, sniffing
the fragrance of the plant, came out of the water, took the plant, returned to its abode, consuming
it, shedding its skin. Whereat Gilgamesh sat down and wept. That is why the plant, the power of
immortal life, which formerly was known as a property of man, was taken away and now remains in
the keep of the cursed serpent. Thus the servant of God at the place where the two seas meet reminds
one of the Gilgamesh epic's figure of the old man. In the Qur'an he is called the "one whom God
granted his mercy and to whom he gave divine wisdom," which is sometimes interpreted as a translation of his name. The granting of the divine favour is perhaps an echo of Utnapishtim's immortality.
Next, in the romance or novel of Alexander the Great, a story is told of the hero accompanied
by his cook Andreas, whom Muslims call Idris. (The prophet Mohammed met Idris during his
nightly journey and ascension). Alexander and his cook are in search for the source of life. After a
long time they decided to go separate ways in order to have more chance of finding the source of
life. By chance Andreas passed by a river. At a given moment during this travels, Andreas opened
the bag containing his fish and washed the salted fish which he had brought with him. The contact
with the water made the fish alive again. The fish swam away. Andreas jumped in after the fish and
in so doing gained immortality. When he met Alexander again and told him of his adventures, the
hero at once realized that this was the well of life. They both set out to find the source again. But all
attempts to find it again fail. Alexander missed the blessed fountain and failed to reach immortality.
(For the Arab tradition Iskandar-Dhu 'I Qarnayn already combines the characteristics of the warlike
hero with those of the prophet of universality). The learned Iranian poet, Nizami (ca. 1141- ca.
1217) locates the story principally in Iran. He makes him the image of the Iranian knight- peaceloving and moderate, courteous and always ready for any noble action. He demonstrates his eclecticism in the information he gives. He says: "I have taken from everything just what suited me and I
have borrowed from recent histories, Christian, Pahlevi and Jewish ... and of them I have made a
whole."
The third source for the Qur'anic story is a rabbinic, Jewish legend. Rabbi Joshua ben Levi
goes on a trip under conditions laid down by Elijah, much like those we have heard of in the Qur'an
story. He is accompanied by Elijah, who does a number of terrible things which have the same
effect on the rabbi as the actions of the stranger have on Moses in the Qur'anic story. Thus we have
several of the same elements: Moses reminds one of the role of Gilgamesh as well as Alexander in
the novel, and of Joshuah ben Levi in the rabbinic legend; the servant of Moses is reminiscent of
Andreas the cook of Alexander. The episode of the fish one finds only in the novel; then there is this
anonymous person, "the servant of our servants," who reminds one of the prophetic figure of the
rabbinic stories, namely Elijah. The test of patience to which the stranger subjects Moses comes
from the Jewish legend only. After having said something about the background of this Qur'anic
story, I want to continue by saying more about the way the story has developed in the Muslim mystical tradition.
mystical elaboration of the Khidr story
Many details missing in the Qur'an were added by later Muslim commentators. The unknown
man receives a name in the commentators' tradition. He is Khidr or Khadir: the Green man. Green
is always connected with paradise and positive, spiritual things. Angels and saints wear green cloths,
for example, and Muslims in Egypt place green around gravestones foreshadowing paradise. Green
is also the colour of the prophet Muhammad; his descendants wear green turbans. Arab Christians,
by the way, see in Khidr a version of Saint George. By the Sufis he is called "the master of the path
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of wisdom." Around this green man arose many legends and stories. He is a mythological figure, a
archetype more than a concrete person, which gives his appearance here a certain message. Moses,
the great prophet and law-giver of the Children of Israel-like Gilgamesh before him-sets out to
search for the source of Divine knowledge. He looks for a certain mysterious, unnamed figure. The
unnamed "green man" (Khadir or Khidr) is as God says, "one of Our servants to whom We granted
mercy and whom we taught in Our knowledge." The knowledge and wisdom he possesses, therefore, are superior to the knowledge and wisdom given to Moses. He lives on a green island abundant with lush vegetation in the heart of the sea. Where Khidr steps green shoots come forth and all
that he touches he brings to life again. This island is marked by a rock and located where the two
seas meet each other. It is at this place where Moses is to meet the mysterious figure.
The story of Khidr is, thus, the story of a meeting, the meeting of the two planes of existence
in which seekers live out their mystical quest. These levels are bound to space and not bound to
space, bound to time and not bound to time. The unnamed servant, Khidr, makes the transition
between the two planes, the two levels possible. It is Khidr who makes the passage between the two
worlds possible. First he has to be sought out, to be recognized. Khidr is always there where the two
planes meet: where the two seas meet, the sea of life and the sea of death.
But how do you know, how do you discover that place where the two seas or the two rivers
meet? There is a specific sign through which Moses and his servant can recognize the place where
the two seas meet: the miraculous coming to life of the cooked fish which the servant of Moses had
prepared for breakfast. The cooked fish finds its way to the sea because of the special quality of the
water at that particular spot: it is water of eternal life. The miracle of resurrection and transformation is symbolized by the revival of the cooked fish. Like the cooked fish, Alexander's companion becomes green-alive-by diving into the water of immortality. All that is touched by it
comes to life again for eternity.
Where is the place where the two rivers or the two seas meet exactly? Some have made great
efforts to try to locate the place geographically. Some argue that it may be the place where the two
rivers, the White and the Blue Nile, meet. But one cannot indicate this place really in a geographical
way. The truth is that one needs to find the teacher at the meeting place of past and future, light and
darkness, the transient and the eternal. The mystical journey is always a searching for the meeting
place. It is a travel toward another level than we are accustomed to. All that dwells upon the earth is
perishing (fanin), yet still abides the face of the Lord, majestic, splendid (Qur'an, 28:88). This place
is marked by a rock, the symbol of God's mercy; it is a refuge, a threshold, a place of rest for the
weary travellers on the path.
To reach the water of mystical immortality which cannot be indicated geographically, the
mystic must, like Gilgamesh, Alexander, Moses and his page, set out for the travel in the course of
which he has also to cross the sea of death. Moses is motivated to make the journey to the place
where the two seas meet to find the teacher who can give him direct knowledge of God. This is the
holy knowledge the mystics are looking for. Only at that meeting point of the two levels of existence, only there can mystical knowledge be transmitted. But even Moses with all his eagerness and
wisdom, and in spite of his special rank as prophet to whom God had spoken "mouth to mouth,"
even Moses did not recognize this meeting point when he reached the place where the two seas
meet. So of course this is much more true for ordinary seekers.
Gilgamesh, Alexander, and Moses all embarked on their journey because they came to realize
that on this plane of existence everything is bound to perish. All three men of great achievement
and of huge egos become humbled when they realize that in the end everything perishes. All three
stand for some grand achievement: there was no hero in ancient Mesopotamia mightier than Gilgamesh; there was no conqueror in antiquity more powerful than Alexander (the Great); there was
no prophet in the Biblical tradition superior to Moses. Yet all three, attaining the summit of man's
efforts, had to realize that all their achievements were transient, ephemeral, without real substance.
Embarking on the journey is in itself a sign of a new attitude, an attitude of humility, poverty, and
longing for true fulfilment.

We are told that as soon as Moses and his page, Joshua bin Nun, discovered that they had
missed the meeting place with the teacher, they at once "returned upon their tracks, retracing them"
the Qur'an says. To retrace one's steps, to recognize one's errors, is a crucial point of the path
(tariqa). This is when the real transition takes place (tawba) repentance, a conversion of the heart.
As the seeker-like Moses, Alexander and Gilgamesh-promises to persevere in the travel,
even if it means that he has to retrace his steps many times ("daily conversion" we call that in the
Christian tradition), then in the right time and place he will meet Khidr, which will direct him step
by step, stage by stage. When despair becomes greater than fear, it is Khidr who intervenes and
comes to his help as the "remover of obstacles who can block the transformation." This ever-present life force gives the seeker strength to change the direction of his erring life.
Searchers, mystics, are looking for a teacher out there, but the outer teacher always points to
the teacher "in here," the inner teacher. Ultimately, the search is for the Khidr within, and the
meeting point of the two seas is where the two places converge within the core of our being, our
own heart. At this point Khidr is waiting. Khidr comes in two ways. He has, as it were, two faces:
He is both the undertaker and the midwife. He shatters illusions and delusions, and then gives
meaning and direction to the soul's search. He is a merciful benefactor, but he can also be a merciless destroyer, of customs and forms of thought. The teacher, like Khidr, is both the reviver of dead
souls and the destroyer of illusions. Like Khidr, he too stands at the meeting point of the opposites
within oneself.
Moses is a law-giver, messenger, the highest rank of prophecy. As a giver of Divine law he represents the highest values of justice and morality. But the teacher robs Moses of these values. Like
Moses, who had to watch Khidr commit atrocious acts without being allowed to ask for an explanation, so the disciple. He must learn to acquire a new insight, to see things with a new perception,
from a new vantage point. Because Khidr's acts, even when he gives an explanation, still only seem
arbitrary and mean. You are still wondering: Is this clear now? Does it solve anything? At some
point must we simply grasp the truth that in the human condition, no answers can be complete?
conclusions
Finally I will try to draw some conclusions from this story for our subject: the role of stories in
interreligious dialogue. There are all kinds of stories in the European tradition which are related to
"the quest." Chaucer's Canterbury Tales may be seen as an example, one in which he elaborated
existing stories. The story about the death of three rebels in the story of the Pardoner is a exemplum, of a text the love for money is the root of all evil. (That story is from an Arab source by the
way!) And of course one of the most famous groups of stories is that of the search for the Holy
Grail. In connection with the example of our story of Khidr, it is remarkable to think of our own
European, "Green Man," as it appears in "Sir Gawain and the Green Knight." That clearly is also a
story of a quest, a search of a man for his destiny. And if we want to descend to the frivolous,
remember the Hulk? Transforming himself to help others, he even turned green!
But is it such a good idea to refer to stories? It is well known that we live in the time when
many stories-sacred and secular- seem to have lost their hold. Is the time passed when we could
tell what we like to call "the" story in some straightforward way? When it is becoming more difficult to tell the Story-the history of Salvation, the Salvation, liberation through Jesus Christ-we
might also think of paying more attention to the smaller stories, also authentic religious and biblical.
In the context of one of the great stories-namely the Christian one-I would like to refer
briefly to the contemporary Biblical scholar Walter Brueggemann. We know that often in the case of
the Bible the emphasis has been on the great story of Salvation. The whole of the Bible and its interpretation is seen as centred around that history of Salvation. Bruegemann asks attention for the
small stories in the Bible. It is evident that this approach is congenial to postmodern perspective, as
it focuses on "little" stories to the disadvantage of the "great story." Focus on the little story requires
us to be, to some extent, free of systematic perspective, and especially of systematic theology. The
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imposition of modern critical or systematic theological categories upon the text has led us to read
the text according to Hellenistic modes of rationality that have come to have most credibility in the
modern world. Such a synthetic, rational approach, however, has required a violation of what is
most characteristically Jewish in the text. For Jewish reading honors texts that are disjointed, "irrational," contradictory, paradoxical, ironic, and scandalous. In Bible reading, new texts require us to
reread everything of God, self, and neighbour in light of neglected texts. Athens and Geneva
together have conspired to suppress some texts, and Jerusalem has often been a willing accomplice.
That suppression has tended to enforce the rationalistic hegemony of modernity, or the controllingdomination of church orthodoxy.
The Bible is the compost pile that provides material for new life. As it is often with such compost, it contains seeds of its own. I submit that this way of reading the text (and reading our life)
contains enormously helpful access points for pastoral care. The Bible provides a script (not the
only script available) for a lived drama that contains all the ingredients for a whole life. The Bible
offers many small dramas, some of which are not easily subordinated to the large "drama of salvation." As the Bible does not consist in a single, large drama, but in many small, disordered dramas,
so our lives are not lived in a single, large unified drama. In fact, we are party to many little dramas.
Brueggemann's argument is that the little dramas of the text need to be taken seriously. They ("little
texts") need only to be told, as resources for the imagination, left there in that secret zone of intimate reflection to do their own hidden work. This fits in with my own concern for stories in
interreligious dialogue.
When we begin to allow the little stories to question us, we will find a perhaps more confusing
set of problems. For there are also the false stories and misleading stories. Stories of quest and pilgrimage and exodus have given Christians inspiration and encouragement through centuries. They
have given inspiration to Pilgrim fathers coming to this land, for example, and also to the Boers in
South Africa. But if the story has been inspirational, it has also been used to justify acts that have
been harmful and brutal. What would the Indian or Black perspective be on these pilgrimages of
faith? And while we may benefit from learning about the meanings of "green" in the stories of the
Muslim tradition, this too can become misused as a cheap trick of inflammatory rhetoric,
denouncing a so-called "Green Peril" in imagined threats from the Middle East. To bridge the gap
between truth and falsehood one needs other kind of stories.
One such work is The Bridge over the River Drina by the Yugoslav Nobel prize-winning author
Ivo Andric. He grew up in Bosnia: Serajewo and Visegrad. This novel is called the classical novel of
the origin of the conflict in Bosnia. What Tolstoy's War and Peace meant for the Napoleonic wars,
this novel could mean for Bosnia. Central in his book is the small town, Visegrad, which he describes
since the time of the Ottomanffurkish supremacy in the sixteenth century, the Austrian invasion
until the beginning of the first World War. The fixed point is all the time the stone bridge over the
river Drina, which not only symbolically connects past and future, but also provides the inevitable
link between East and West, rich and poor, Serbs, Turks, Croats, Jews and Muslims in their effort
towards a symbiosis. Observers have noted for decades how great are the similarities between Serbs
and Croats. There is not an old cultural break: they speak the same language and have lived already
for centuries next to each other. But our time has seen an unlearning of that common language as
we have failed to tell the stories that will show our mutual understanding.
In another place in Bosnia, Mostar, the east and the westside of the Neretva river was for centuries connected by a beautiful bridge you found in every tourist guidebook of the former
Yugoslavia. This bridge was built in 1566 by a student of the famous Ottoman architect Sinan, a
jewel of Ottoman architecture connecting for over 400 years Muslims and Christians. In 1993 this
connection was destroyed by Croatian militia, and one of the preconditions for justice and peace in
this world of ours is that bridge will be rebuilt.
Back finally to my example of the Khidr story. The islamic popular piety sees Khidr as a "saint"
(wali) and there are those who say that every century will see his own Khidr or Khadir or Green
Man. This story of Khidr from the Qur'an is, as we saw, from a multi-religious and multi-cultural

background: (Babylonic, Sumerian, Greek, Helleni~tic and Jewish. It has also become an islamic
story. But it is not less inspiring for a Hindu or a Christian. It is a story anyone can understand who
has ears to hear and a heart to understand. This particular story coming from this multi-religious
and multi-cultural background can help us in our multi-religious and multi-cultural societies. It is
namely the story of the need-yes, the necessity- of our personal transformation and the transformation of our societies.
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Readers of this issue will want to know that the Michaelmas issue, due out in mid-September,
will include an expanded version of the remarks made in response to these two lectures by
Professor Nelly van Doom-Harder. After a summer's trip to Indonesia, where she has lived and
worked at inter-religious dialogue for a number of years, Professor van Doom-Harder will add
further comments on specific dialogue processes to her original remarks.
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HOUSE HUNTING
"Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods really dwell,
and they hear their voices and receive their answers . ... "
Plato, Phaedo
Our realtor reminds me of my freshman
philosophy teacher, a would-be Cagney
with mid-life spread filling out
the blue sportcoat and gray pants.
As he flips through keys, small-talking,
dismissing all before finding the one
that clicks open the lock, I can almost see
Professor Azar leaning over his desk,
doing his best to sell forty blank stares
on the virtues of virtue.
Few of us cared
to get his ad hoc lectures salvaged
from dead air, Socratic jibes
fallen cold as sparks in Plato's Cave,
each of us intent on a reel of shadows
flickering like television in our heads,
while he'd have trooped us through a world
of Forms, which was what he loved best,
the soul's furnishings arranged in perfect
rooms of thought,
each attribute without flawlike the whitewashed walls of this parlor
hung with the owner's family portraits
grown forlorn in his absence, as though
lifted from their fixtures they floated
through space, no longer here, as we are,
watched by what's foreign,
as we imagine ourselves at homethis sofa our couch, these knickknacks
shipped to somewhere else, shelves
filled with books, and each studied room
a dream of forgotten life.
Our realtor takes such care,
pointing out cracks in plaster, slippages
of kitchen tiles, floorboards, runs his eye
across walls, ceilings, checks the basement
circuit box, wanting, it seems, what's best
for us, inspecting the house as if it were
an argument of the world's soundness,
in every niche a subtlety. And we follow
like disciples who want to believe
Here is where we belong, sunlight
burnishing the windowpanes, the dust
hazed and swirling like first stars.

Daniel Tobin

compassionate pilgrims

Theodore M. Ludwig

While Paul was waiting for them in Athens, he was deeply distressed to see that the city was full of idols. So he argued in the
synagogue with the Jews and the devout persons, and also in the marketplace every day with those who happened to be there. Also
some Epicurean and Stoic philosophers debated with him. Some said, "What does this babbler want to say?" Others said, "He seems
to be a proclaimer of foreign divinities." (This was because he was telling the good news about Jesus and the resurrection.) So they
took him and brought him to the Areopagus and asked him, "May we know what this new teaching is that you are presenting? It
sounds rather strange to us, so we would like to know what it means." Now all the Athenians and the foreigners living there would
spend their time in nothing but telling or hearing something new. Then Paul stood in front of the Areopagus and said, "Athenians, I
see how extremely religious you are in every way. For as I went through the city and looked carefully at the objects of your worship, I
found among them an altar with the inscription, 'To an unknown god. ' What therefore you worship as unknown, this I proclaim to
you. The God who made the world and everything in it, he who is Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in shrines made by human
hands, nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mortals life and breath and all
things. From one ancestor he made all nations to inhabit the whole earth, and he allotted the times of their existence and the boundaries of the places where they would live, so that they would search for God and perhaps grope for him and find him-though indeed
he is not far from each one of us. For 'In him we live and move and have our being;' as even some of your own poets have said, 'For
we too are his offspring.' Since we ought not to think that the deity is like gold, silver, or stone, an image formed by the art and imagination of mortals. While God has overlooked the times of human ignorance, now he commands all people everywhere to repent,
because he has fixed a day on which he will have the world judged in righteousness by a man whom he has appointed, and of this he
has given assurance to all by raising him from the dead. " When they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some scoffed; but others
said, "We will hear you again about this." At that point Paul/eft them. But some of them joined him and became believers, including
Dionysius the Areopagite and a woman named Damaris, and others with them. Acts 17:16-34 (NRSV)

What an exciting religious adventure! This new Christian convert jaunted around much of the
Hellenistic world-Jerusalem to Antioch, to Cyprus, Philippi, Athens, Corinth, even to Rome. This
was a world of diverse faiths and worldviews, and everywhere Paul went he plunged into dialogue,
Luke tells us, arguing and debating with Jewish and Greek thinkers and anyone who happened to be
in the marketplace. Out of that kind of dialogue over the next centuries, the Christian church took
shape in this Hellenistic world.
The encounter we just read about, in Athens, is fascinating. It shows Paul knew and used the
language of Jewish thinkers and Greek philosophers-God who made the world does not live in
shrines and does not need anything from humans; in God we live and move and have our being,
indeed God is not far from each one of us; and so forth. Paul even makes the intriguing assertion
that God made all nations, each in their own times and locales, "so that they would search for God
and perhaps grope for God and find God." That's food for continuing debate! Paul was a great
debater and arguer-a style that fit well in this religiously diverse yet intellectually integrated Hellenistic world. "We will hear you again about this"-those parting words from the philosophers
echoed for a few centuries until the Christian church became consolidated and dominant in the
Roman world, and then dialogue and debate with people from other religious convictions fell out of
the picture. The challenge of truths in the other traditions no longer had to be taken seriously.
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But now, at the very end of this second millennium of Christian history, we find ourselves in a
new, unsettling situation. Now our neighbors both globally and locally include Jews, Muslims,
Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, and so on-even our students, even our faculty. And the argumentative
Hellenistic style doesn't fit our pluralistic situation very well. There are times, of course, for good
intellectual dialogues and debates between Christian scholars and scholars of other faiths. But is the
intellectual debater the best model for us today? That can be a safe way of keeping distant, not
being vulnerable, staying in control. We're talking about our human family that is compressing, our
brothers and sisters who are Muslims and Hindus-we need to explore new ways of relating
together.
I don't know if Paul perhaps mellowed later in his life, but there's a different portrait of him
agonizing over the question of his brother and sisters-the Jewish people-as he wrote the letter to
the Romans, in chapters 9-11. I picture him brooding there, not as a self-assured debater, but rather
like a pilgrim on the way, filled with compassion for his fellow pilgrims, his Jewish relatives, coming
up with another "perhaps"-perhaps, he says, in the very persistence of the Jews in their own way,
God is working to have mercy on all. And he simply ends with an appeal to the mysteries of God:
"0 the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are God's judgments and how inscrutable God's ways!"
We today, I believe, are called to be like that, to be compassionate pilgrims on the way, with a
deep acknowledgment of God's mysteries, in loving and respectful conversation with those fellow
pilgrims who live beyond our Christian thought-frames, symbols, and beliefs. Our human community is thoroughly pluralistic, whether we like it or not. People of other faiths are there, they are
here, and the question is whether we know how to listen to them and how to respond to them.
Probably that is our intellectual, theological task in the future: listening to learn from these neighbors and friends who live by other faiths; and responding by wrestling with our own sources of revelation and truth as we construct anew our theological understandings for this age. We need to hold
fast to both poles. For if we drop the listening part we become exclusive and arrogant; but if we
drop our rootedness and searching engagement in our own revelation we simply swing in the pluralistic wind. Holding to both, perhaps we can be compassionate pilgrims.
What might that look like today? I'm not sure. Just recently I watched a film of a Native American Apache celebration, a girl's puberty initiation ritual. The Apaches are struggling with poverty
and loss of identity, and this important festival is a time of renewal for the whole community. These
Apache men and women and children are dancing and singing their sacred lore, and the girl is
believed to be filled with the powers of Changing Woman, who brings growth and transformation.
There among them is a Franciscan monk, dancing in the celebration with them, complete with his
black robes and hat. This Franciscan monk has lived with the people for a long time and is considered a member of the community. That simple image is haunting. Yes, it raises questions to reflect
on, big questions. But there he is, a compassionate pilgrim, listening and being with the Apache
people, holding on to and exploring Christian identity.
Somehow that image links with the image of Jesus, our central model of the compassionate pilgrim. Jesus listened, healed, and celebrated with all, even the outsiders and aliens, Samaritans and
Syro-Phoenicians. And Jesus searched and struggled with God's revelation, and finally went on the
way of the cross. The way of the cross is still our way. We are called to be the presence of Christ to
all the peoples of our pluralistic world, that is, to our neighbors. That surely means sharing our faith
and our truth with them. But we can't be present to them if we don't also listen to them-and we
can't really listen if we don't know their languages, their sacred texts, their world visions, their joys
and sorrows, hopes and dreams, rituals and truths. When we really listen, perhaps we may experience something of the depths of God's mysteries; we may find God somehow being present to us
through them. It's risky, for such listening and searching can lead along uncharted ways. But this is
the model of our Lord. And we have our Lord's promise to be with us always. And so, with faithfulness and humility and expectancy, we can open ourselves to our fellow pilgrims in this pluralistic
world-God's world-and be on our way with compassion and rejoicing.
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TRIPTYCH
I. Prayer
What you most need you will do again, or start over
and do again. One: the way you learned to forgive yourself
your failed art, the other: the way you learned to burn it.

II. Prayer
Ashes do not form again into flame, or again into a body.
How then did you survive giving your old self up? How did you
step from the elements and return to your shattered form?

III. Prayer
You learned to forgive art's failing you. You put your thumb
up against the world, and with one eye, see it true. Your other
hand not so much points toward heaven, but holds up.

Jeffrey Shotts
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the big picture

Charles Vandersee

Dear Editor:
Marry in your mind, if you will, the poet
Emily Dickinson (1830-1886) and the nature/
science writer David Quammen (born 1948), as
this year's guides to what church-related higher
education might attempt. Quammen first, in an
interview with Wild Duck Review (Nevada City,
California), the winter 1999 issue. They gave
out free copies at the Western Literature Association meeting in Sacramento last October.
Interviewer Casey Walker risked the casual
expression "bigger picture," when asking
Quammen "what kind of world we are creating." His response, in part:
[I]t depends on how you define the bigger picture. I would say that the bigger picture is that
we have a planet with great biological diversity,
and it's headed back down into a mass extinction. Somebody else would say that the bigger
picture is that Jesus loves me .... We're constantly having a debate about what the big picture is. Some people are saying that the big picture is that Clinton lied in front of the grand
jury. Others are saying that the big picture is
that the Asian economy has fallen apart, or that
people in Madagascar have to cut down forests
to feed their children. We're constantly implicitly or explicitly arguing about whose version
of the big picture is biggest.

Yes, what are the master narratives that people
live and die by, or cling to because they know
few of the others? What if alert students at good
colleges went out and asked people across the
spectrums?
Of course, we wouldn't know what to do
with the "biggest" picture. Even if we all settled
on it, many of us have no pertinent talents or
interest. People work on their own smaller pictures-perhaps, like Dickinson, creating a poetic

oeuvre in which the biggest picture might be
God, self, paradox, language, or soul crisis. Even
if most nation-states and other jurisdictions
agreed on the Biggest Picture, public policy
would not reflect that consensus. Will city councils in rich Silicon Valley airlift San Joaquin
Valley green vegetables to Madagascar?
Nonetheless, Quammen's observation
offers every liberal arts college, religious or not,
a curriculum intervention. Whatever the area
requirements happen to be, shouldn't one
course a year-four total-constitute an interdisciplinary exploration of Big Pictures, then
and now? For the church college, shouldn't two
of those four courses come at the issue from the
point of view of its own putative theology?
At Brandeis, for example, after sophomores
in fall semester solicit from Waltham residents
some incommensurate Big Pictures, spring
semester would bring forward a faculty team
with yardsticks from Judaism measuring size.
Bob Jones University summons the New Testament, Notre Dame delves into Thomism. None
of these need be required courses; for success,
make them invitational (or purchased by outbidding, like coveted business-school courses),
though much-publicized and available on live
telecast and videotape.
That's Quammen's side of the marriage.
Let Dickinson, a unique personality in American
civilization if ever there was one, stand for once
not as idiosyncratic but as representative. Call
her typical of the widespread 19th-century loss
of faith, in the words of biographer Richard
Sewall:
These Dickinsons, certainly [her brother]
Austin and Emily, faced a spiritual crisis
unknown, or at least not articulated, by their
elders. The old forms and formulations were
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losing their sustaining power. . . . Apparently,
his heterodoxy was a real obstacle in his early
relations with [his future wife] Sue; he, a Dickinson, had to plead with her not to dismiss him
as an atheist .... None of the three children
was especially pious or churchly. Although
Vinnie dutifully joined the church during the
Revival of 1850, there is nothing in anything
she said or did, certainly not in the years when
she needed it most, that shows she got much
help from it....
Each one of these younger Dickinsons, at one time or another, took a stance that
required new, fresh expression. (237£)

If Quammen's curriculum examines competing Big Pictures, Dickinson is the reminder
that future life on earth needs to wonder which
Big Ideas will work. Also, which ones once did
but now don't, and which ones never did. For
the Dickinsons, who apparently made reasonable effort, 19th-century Christianity didn't
work. Shouldn't a church college, ranging
widely through world history, examine instances
in these three categories, applying its own theology? Not attempt to explain why something
doesn't work (Original Sin will always be the
answer, which also happens to be one of those
Big Pictures), but use theology as imagination.
That is, fresh expression of what might work, or
should be done.
Consider, of all things, the site design of
HBCUs-Historically Black Colleges and Universities in the U.S. A 1999 article in American
Quarterly, journal of the American Studies Association, had caught my eye, and then its author,
landscape architect Ian Grandison, visited the
University here in Dogwood last spring.
Black colleges, when founded, were run by
people of imagination, who wanted to ground
young freedmen in studies truly empowering:
the arts and sciences. But they needed to be seen
by the mainstream white population as nonthreatening: trade schools for agriculture and
the mechanic arts. So academic buildings, especially the library, were designed to appear
modest, even hidden, from the main road past
the campus, facing inward. When you drove in,
at Tuskegee, for example, you first saw the
blacksmith shop and saw mill.
Effacement, however, is one of those Big
Ideas that no longer works, thanks in part to a
pastor and theologian, Martin Luther King, Jr.
Mrican Americans have been emerging from

strategic subterfuge, and recent HBCU campus
renovation projects show a prouder face to the
main road. Thus Ian Grandison.
Colonial governance in North America no
longer worked, as of about 1776. City air in
places like Mexico City, Beijing, and Phoenix no
longer works, in the sense of being breathable
by human lungs. The U.S. Constitution, for a
nation of about 4 million people in 1790, may
no longer work so well for a nation of 270 million. The mainstream denominations of Christianity seem not to be working so well, failing to
pander to thrill-seekers. A hundred years or so
ago in the U.S. laissez-faire commerce and
industry seemed not working so well, hence the
Pure Food and Drug Act and regulations on
interstate commerce. Corner taverns in 1920
didn't seem to be working, in the sense of promoting sober republican (small r) virtue, but by
1930 gangster Prohibition wasn't working
either.
Various of these nonworking entities
emerge in standard courses, in history, theology,
architecture, geography, and political theory, but
not as major issues for sustained attention, and
not crying together for imaginative theorizing
and theologizing.
One reason may be that liberal education
keeps getting expressed unfreshly. It's one of the
least well-hung of the old Big Pictures. Traditionally conducted in a non-virtual, non-dependent (on electronics) setting, liberal (freedominducing) education consists of texts to examine,
ideas to ponder within discrete disciplines,
semester-length experiences of certain kinds
(labs, independent study, study abroad). Maybe
examination of greatness and worth: some
human achievements acknowledged as more
consequential, Bigger if not "better," than
others.
All this is occasionally varied by interdisciplinarity, which can be a mere set of readings
presided over by a committee neither omniscient
nor imaginative.
Still focusing on the grand trinity
announced above-the present, past, and future
of What Does and Doesn't Work-couldn't a
course ask students to develop presentations of
such instances as alchemy, Ptolemy, phlogiston,
Baal, asbestos, psychoanalysis, genocide, New
Age pseudoscience, biblical literalism, conspic-
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uous consumption, and Edsel marketing? Ideally also in-laws, brokers, and deodorants,
except that liberal education remains methodologically queasy on affiliating personal traumas
with those of the ages. Wouldn't a really solid
semester of such instances yield fresh patterns
and paradigms?
Would it, at the very least, help participants
toward modesty concerning today's certainties,
resist apocalypticism (pace Quammen), and
invigorate imagination? In church-related colleges, shouldn't each religious tradition have
insights as to what to do when something didn't
or wouldn't work? Did Constantine, one of the
early muscular Christians, solve a problem in
Rome or create one? What would be our advice
to him and us, now that we see the subsequent
Big Pictures?
Imagination: Quite as stimulating as the
study of what won't work is the attempt to
create something new by avoiding what won 't
work, elegiacally appealing though things busted
tend to be. In literary studies, "workshop
poems," for example, in which the "I" is no rich
persona but the unlayered adolescent voice of
inexperience. These are notorious productions
in the literary community-unironic labors vanishing in pathos, like the inspirational verse of
the nineteenth century. Dead-on-arrival workshop poems typically romanticize one's downto-earth grandparents, or gently cook a meal
from scratch with best friends.
That maladroit nineteenth century generated strong feeling, amid wars and other imperious distractions, that moral uplift would triumph. An admiring deity would not permit
oblivion to earnest quatrains concerning family
values, self-sacrifice, faith tested and triumphant, nature spiritualized. But instead this
ironic deity conferred fame on Walt Whitman
and Emily Dickinson, moral mavericks, worshiping respectively the lusty common citizen as
mere bundle of energy, and the imperial heterodox self. Literary piety didn't work too well.
On returning from six days in Rome (first
visit) a couple of months ago, I thought about
writing a poem. People who write poems write
travel poems when they travel, usually dead
ones. They don't work. I did not need to write
about Rome in order to claim part of the trip as
a tax deduction. That I took care of by buying

Italian translations of two American novels that
I teach, Henry Roth's Call It Sleep (Chiamalo
sonno) and Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man (Uomo
invisibile), complete with footnotes, often
instructive. For Chiamalo sonno, set on the
Lower East Side of New York, about 1907-1912,
Italian readers need il drug-store defined: un
tipico locale americana, comprendente tabaccheria, cartoleria, profumeria, farmacia, bar e
tavola calda [cafeteria].
The morning after getting back I awoke at
4:45, jet lag having dropped me into bed at 9:00
p.m. The sensation upon awakening was not of
grogginess or the need for bladder relief but the
feeling that I and Sylvia Plath were about to
compose a poem. Of course I was only half
awake, a condition ideal for delusion and error,
and creativity. Perhaps indeed this vigorous somnolence is what accounts for the erratic popularity of such non-working phenomena as psychoanalysis and biblical literalism: people halfawake to that portion of the self which marshals
reality.
Even half awake, you know what won't
work in a modern or postmodern Rome poem.
No new Rome poem should name-drop, either
sites or people. No new Rome visitor should try
to express something fresh about Rome. No new
Rome poem should pretend that the reader is
interested in the poet's savory meals, tasteless
traveling companions, or luminous epiphanies.
Genuine novelty, yes; if, say, Cardinal Ratzinger
in his rigidity had dropped dead on the street,
that might make for interesting noises in
someone's Rome poem.
Readers wish to be spared predictable juxtapositions. Rome, one of the world's holy cities,
is ironically (tiresomely) also a carnival of the
profane: pickpockets, exhaust fumes, clueless
pilgrims, rowdy school groups, and pricey boutiques still catering to Renaissance acquisitive
instincts.
Barely half awake, I still saw the Big Picture: what wouldn't work and what might. This
surely indicates that a whole college course
could be quickly constructed by smart faculty
members suffering jet lag after flights at college
expense to valuable world venues. My eventual
poem made modest use of Sylvia Plath, whose
early journals (about to be published) were
splashed over the front page of the Guardian,

picked up between flights at Heathrow. That and
the pope's imminent visit to Israel anchored the
poem in a specific moment.
The rest of the poem merely pretends to
drift about the city, not quite as in a dream but
also without apparent design, avoiding the
Forum, the Trevi Fountain, Via Veneto, the
Tiber, Hadrian's Tomb, and other obligatory
icons, while also not pretending to make proud
little idiosyncratic discoveries. It doesn't pretend
to do history or culture; it's a nice poem,
friendly, nice voice, nice tone, hopelessly ingenuous, pretending (all 120 lines) not to know
quite what it's doing. That might work.
What does it mean-where were we?-that
Baal doesn't work? In this story-a rather condescending one-Elijah mocks mercilessly the
prophets of Baal, who seem unable to perform
simple miracles of the sort that YHWH does
with a flick of the finger, the redoubtable finger

on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, now cleaned
and luminous. Baal would be simply one of the
old gods that failed: didn't work, went on vacation. One excitement of the liberal arts student
is to develop the capacity to identify some of
these. What in ancient Rome did and didn't
work, and won't?
Being liberally educated, we know that
placebos work. Thus psychoanalysis and
astrology do work at times, also myths that overwrite history, maybe Baal if cleaned up and
restored. Workshop poems work, in the sense of
constituting no threat to the Constitution or air
pollution. But the imagination by the end of the
prescribed four years-even the religious imagination-should be taught to demand more than
placebos, and that might be the Big Picture for
this year.
From Dogwood, yours faithfully,

VOCATION
He was only ever seen
from the corners of the eyes.
He had always suffered
in this way, had turned
inward, away from each pair
of eyes ignoring him.
What he knew but couldn't
admit was that sometimes
it is terrible to be chosen.
But everyone bears
history's weight. Sometimes
slumped shoulders, hands
in pockets, sideways glances
made him bear it more.

Jeffrey Shotts
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Mr. Chips, can we talk early retirement?

Jennifer Voigt

Why do we expect teachers to do so much
more than teach? They act in loco parentis; they
nurture their students and minister to them.
They take them by the hand and mentor them.
What does any of this have to do with the subjects they teach? This question is one of the paradoxes of films that portray the teachers and the
teaching profession. Their characters are trained
educators, but their stories only sporadically
focus on the subjects they teach. Instead, they
concern themselves with issues. It is a wonder
how many films about teacher are message
movies that pit the teacher/protagonist against a
challenge of national concern. The spectre of
racism looms over Stand and Deliver, which
together with Dangerous Minds concerns itself
with the problems inherent to trying to learn in
America's inner cities. Music of the Heart also
finds the inner-city's particular problems perplexing, though it focuses its energy on the
plight of school music programs, which have
been high-profile victims of budget cutbacks all
over the country. Mr. Holland's Opus sees Mr.
Holland, a dedicated long-time music teacher,
fall victim to those same cutbacks. This interest
in such issues is in part because many of these
films were based on actual events in the lives of
actual teachers, including Stand and Deliver,
Dangerous Minds, and Music of the Heart. The
issues that these films discuss were all themes in
the working lives of the teachers who inspired
them. But these films also adhere to a codified
narrative that has come to shape films about
teachers, the prototype of which is the story of
Mr. Chipping in Goodbye Mr. Chips.
Goodbye Mr. Chips first appeared on film
in 1939. It was an English production with English actors and an American director. Based on a
beloved book, the film was wildly successful.

Greer Garson was nominated for an Academy
Award for her work in the film, her first screen
role. Robert Donat won the Oscar in the Best
Actor category that year for playing the title role,
and the film itself won Best Picture. It has
become one of those movies that, when you get
it at the video store, the clerk just gushes. "I
watch this one often-it's one of my favorites,"
she told me a few months ago.
Mr. Chipping is a Latin teacher, but we
never see him do much teaching. On his
deathbed, Mr. Chips overhears his attendants
mourning the fact that he never had children.
Mr. Chips uses his last breath to admonish them,
stating emphatically that he has had thousands
of children-all of them boys. This understanding of Mr. Chips as father to the boys who
have passed through his school comes as no surprise-he cares less that they master their Latin
than they have enough to eat. He welcomes
them to his house to calm their fears on their
first days. In the scenes devoted to his relationships with the students, he does indeed act as
their father. These are no penniless orphans, of
course; they are aristocrats-dukes and officers
to be. However, away from their homes they
might as well be asking for more gruel. The film
assumes the boys' need to be parented-whether
comforted or caned, and it calls on Mr. Chipping to do so. Goodbye Mr. Chips assumes that a
sentimental education takes the place of an academic one.
Mr. Chips realizes his lifelong ambition to
become headmaster of Brookfield as all of the
able-bodied schoolmasters around him go off to
fight the Great War. Elderly and frail, he watches
with much of his own grief as generations of
men he knew as boys go off to France never to
return. During a bombing raid he leads the
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assembled students in a Latin lesson about a particular Roman campaign, and elicits laughter
from the frightened children when they read
that the Roman writer 's enemies are also
Gerrnan. It could be an excellent example of
teaching to the situation if it were important to
the film that the kids learn their Latin lessons.
Goodbye Mr. Chips, however, is concerned with
an issue.
Mr. Chips, despite earlier settings, is about
the Second World War. At Brookfield, teachers
instill "moral courage" in their charges as they
"mould men." England knew even before September of that year what was in store for
Europe, and how it would be compelled to
respond. This movie wanted to remind its
prewar audience just which virtues it takes to
fight wars and win them. That Mr. Chipping suffers a great deal by the war is obvious. Each
evening in the school chapel he reads the names
of the Brookfield alumni who have fallen in
battle. One night he reads the name of a former
teacher of German at Brookfield who died
fighting for the Kaiser. The students are puzzled.
Why would this strange old man do such a
thing? Why does he insist that we grieve for
those who would destroy us? Mr. Chips' understanding of the ambiguities of war makes it that
much better as a piece of propaganda. A man big
enough to pray for his enemies though they may
slaughter his children surely displays the appropriate virtues of honor and duty.
Goodbye Mr. Chips wanted, also, to remind
its audience just what it could lose if it lost to the
Germans. The Great War scenes come about
only in the last act of the film, giving the Mr.
Chipping character time to establish itself as an
English institution. As his students know, Chipping is Brookfield and Brookfield is Chipping.
Brookfield, we are told, was founded in 1492,
an auspicious year for an empire anxious to
know that, despite an expanding universe, England is forever its center. How better to
remember King and country as you prepare for
battle than in the form of a kindly schoolmaster
who has invited you into his house to feed you
cakes and tell you jokes and stave off your loneliness while you were at school?
Tradition is no less important in Dead Poets
Society than it is in Goodbye Mr. Chips. Dead
Poets Society may think it's attacking tradition,

exposing its evils, bringing Walt Whitman in to
yawp it away for good, but its own cinematography does it in. The movie's vision of an
Eastern boys' school campus in the 50s drips
with autumn-leaf-migrating-Canada-geese nostalgia. It needs some weeds or something. Are
those shots with the boys running through the
forest, hooded as if they went to Hogwarts
School of Witchcraft and Wizardry, supposed to
be their hour of splendor in the grass? There is
too much condensation in that chilly cave for
that and not enough eglantine.
Traditions, as we know, are not always so
benign. We are incensed by the racism of the
College Board in Stand and Deliver, where officials insist that the kids from the inner city pass
the Advanced Placement Calculus exam twice.
We hate their racism because we want the kids
to come out winning in the end. "There!" we say.
"These kids are just as smart as any others-even
smarter! They are already getting ahead. Why
should they get any more federal dollars?"
As Stand and Deliver demonstrates, contemporary teacher films address the wars we
fight in the United States today. These wars are
not the crises of the week, but deeper crises that
these smaller news items only mask. They
include racism, class difference, and the idea of
a national culture. They manifest themselves in
debates over what subjects deserve to be taught
in schools and who deserves to be taught.
Contemporary films about teachers include
specific narrative references to Goodbye Mr.
Chips. They generally feature a sequence in
which the teacher first fails to establish trust
among students, and then gradually wins them
over. In Goodbye Mr. Chips, this endeavor consists of two scenes, separated by twenty years. In
Dead Poets Society, it is the scene where Mr.
Keating encourages the students to rip literary
theory (or, at least, the screenwriters' idea of literary theory) literally out of their textbooks.
Each of the films celebrates the accomplishments
of an individual, acknowledging his or her work
above all other characters in the film . In these
films, the students may be bright and dedicated
and interested in learning, but the triumph is the
teacher's. But in granting the teacher the glory,
they also require the teacher to practice self-sacrifice and the loss of personal ambition.
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When one of his students visits him in his
rooms and remarks about cramped space, Mr.
Keating responds, with slight irony, about his
"monastic vows." He is not alone among
teachers on screen. Films about teachers equate
teacherly virtue with a degree of martyrdom.
Jaime Escalante creates lesson plans in the hospital while recovering from a heart attack and
gives them to his students to execute. Roberta,
played by Meryl Streep in Music of the Heart,
directs her students in a concert at Carnegie Hall
and doesn't even bother to put her hair up. She
looks like a mop with a fiddle. Couldn't Roberta
make a concession to civilization when she is so
near its locus? But the convention demands that
she be dumpy. Somehow we just couldn't trust a
teacher whoshowed up in a pair of Manolo Blahniks and a dress by Vivienne Westwood. Mr.
Chipping lets himself go, too, insisting as he
does on wearing torn robes and surrendering to
his unruly facial hair.
Michelle Pfeiffer, who surely had it in her
contract for Dangerous Minds that she would
not look anything less than exquisite, does give
up something to become a teacher. Her character, LouAnne Johnson, comes to her students
from a successful career and a less-than-successful marriage. In Music of the Heart,
Roberta's husband has left her, though for much
of the film she clings to her belief that he will
come back. Teaching violin at an impoverished
school is in the beginning for her a temporary
prospect, a thing for her to leave when her husband returns to his senses and she can return to
being a full time wife and mother. When she
finally gives up hope for her marriage, her
school still refuses to elevate her past the level of
"substitute teacher," though in reality she runs
her own program and subs for no one. Mr. Chipping cannot realize his destiny without losing his
wife and child along the way, as the deathbed
scene demonstrates. Mr. Holland must realize
his greatest ambition only at the end of his career
and be happy with a bunch of amateurs performing his beloved lifetime's work.
We attribute their greatness to destiny. On
the way to Carnegie Hall, Roberta's mother
comments that if Roberta's husband had never
left her, Roberta's violin program would never
have been conceived. Teacher films love to show
how reluctant their subjects are to enter or stay

in the teaching profession. There are so many
great things these people could do, the films say,
but their real calling requires them to sublimate
themselves, to take monastic vows and a pitiful
$23,000 a year to do what they do best. These
films inevitably tempt their protagonists with
visions of the good life. In Dangerous Minds, it
is a life without having your students die in drive
by shootings. For Roberta it is a return to a life
as a military wife.
This issue of self-sacrifice and denial in the
name of one's students is a question of national
interest in education and the point at which contemporary movies about teachers diverge from
their prototype. While Mr. Chipping's story
serves as a call for self-sacrifice in a time of crisis,
these films ask us to admire a sense of duty and
dedication without actually asking us to do anything. These are "feel good" films, which inspire
our emotions during our time in the darkness of
the theatre, but dissolve in our memories at first
light, like the ghosts in our dreams. These films
in no way introduce these issues into the
national debate, Hollywood is too slow-moving
and the films appear long after the teachers portrayed in these films accomplish whatever fate
challenged them to.
I think that we have a need to see the same
story about teachers sacrificing for their students
repeatedly because we are not doing it ourselves.
I mean that the love and devotion these characters give to their students takes us off the hook.
Teachers in these stories act in our places. These
characters assure us that though our institutions
are under attack-individualism, love, class,
race-that some one is guarding them and
fighting for them on our behalf. Greer Garson
was Mrs. Chipping and then she was Mrs.
Miniver. Do not worry, children, though the
bombs may fall as close as your front room, this
English wife will guard you and keep you safe.
Garson was Elizabeth Barrett during the war,
too, so fit was she to play all much beloved English women. But that was her only role opposite
Olivier. She couldn't do Cathy in that other
wartime fantasy of desire and self-indulgence,
Wuthering Heights. Cathy loved Heathcliff, who
would have sold himself to the Nazis if it meant
stealing Wuthering Heights away from its inheritors. Where did he learn that? f

the dying of the light or the glimmering of the dawn?

Robert Benne

Robert Benne is
purported to
understand religious
claims and
phenomena through
the prism of
Enlightenment
reason itself.
He writes regularly
for The Cresset.

In recent years this journal, as well as many
another academic journals, has featured its share
of articles and book reviews analyzing the secularization of American academic life, both in its
public and private manifestations. The blockbusters of recent years have mainly told the sad
story of the loss of religious influence-in both
its intellectual and ethos dimensions-in the
many institutions of American higher education.
George Marsden's The Soul of the American
Academy: From Protestant Establishment to
Established Nonbelief has probably been the
best known account of public institutions. But
there are many other strong analyses, one
offered by the current Dean of Christ College at
Valparaiso, Mark Schwehn, who wrote Exiles
from Eden: Religion and the Academic Vocation
in America.
More surprisingly and depressingly,
church-related colleges and universities have
also succumbed to the same pressures of secularization that "de-Christianized" the publics.
James Burtchaell's The Dying of the Light: The
Disengagement of Colleges and Universities from
their Christian Churches is certainly the most
widely discussed analysis of the private, churchrelated colleges and universities. While there
may be good reasons for the publics to be secularized, there is scarcely any compelling justification for so many church-related schools to jettison their connection to their sponsoring religious heritages. Yet, Burtchaell tells detailed stories of the disengagement of sixteen schools
from their denominational traditions.
It is a popular parlor sport to criticize
Burtchaell these days. Many of the criticisms leveled at him have more to do with his tone than
with substantive matters. He does not suffer

fools gladly and he suspects that most of the
people who presided over the secularization of
the colleges and universities were just that. But
some criticisms are more substantive. For one,
critics have argued that he holds religious
schools to extremely high-if not unrealisticstandards, most of which he does not make
explicit. Thus, none of the seventeen schools he
surveyed seemed to live up to his ideals. And he
has little tolerance for those who haven't; they
fall into an amorphous pit of failure. Further, his
selection of schools seems to suggest that he
chose only those who would fit his story of woe.
Or, if they didn't fit it, he made them fit it.
Finally, for Burtchaell there is an air of inexorability about the secularization process. Once a
school has started on the slippery slope its final
destination is fatefully clear.
Nevertheless, even granting the accuracy of
these criticisms, Burtchaell is essentially correct
in his assessment of the vast majority of churchrelated colleges and universities. They have gone
the way of all flesh. But he is not completely
right. There are high-quality schools that have
resisted secularization. Indeed, a small number
have constructed positive models of Christian
higher education that are not defensive
responses to secularization but bold ventures
developed out of the Christian vision itself.
Others have struggled against the temptations of
secularization and prevailed. Yet others have
remained connected in less robust, but nonetheless meaningful ways. Happily, some colleges
and universities have even reversed the trend
toward secularization in their own lives and
found new ways to relate to their parent traditions.
The · story isn't as monochromatically
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dismal as Burtchaell maintains. Indeed, there is
some reason to believe that instead of the dying
of the light we may be seeing the glimmering of
the dawn. Partly because of the intense discussion of secularization and its effects, many
schools are reassessing their trajectories and considering a more meaningful relation to their heritages. For the Catholic schools, the Pope's Ex
Corde letter provides a real spur to discussion
and action. Such moves might well contribute to
these schools' "descriptness," thus helping them
avoid a descent into the morass of generic liberal arts colleges. Further, with the erosion of a
normative national culture that supplied stable
meanings and values that colleges could assume
in their students and faculty, schools search for
normative visions that can give them identity,
clarify their missions and integrate their curricula. The Enlightenment paradigm, which
claimed to supply such a vision and which in
many cases replaced the Christian, seems gravely
wounded as an organizing principle. The Christian tradition-with its grand vision, persisting
ethos and intellectual tradition-looks more and
more attractive to those wayward colleges of the
church. So we may be seeing a number of
prodigal colleges and universities returning to
their home
traditions, if not begging for forgiveness at least
asking for nourishment from a heritage that
bears a richer menu than was heretofore recognized.
Moreover, America is blessed with a
number of foundations whose largesse has been
strategically directed to strengthening the connection between college and Church. The Lilly
Foundation and the Pew Charitable Trusts are
the most visible of a significant number of such
foundations. They are making a serious contribution to reconnecting school and churchly heritage. In addition, the long period of economic
expansion that has increased foundation money
has made individual gifts to colleges and universities more frequent and generous. And many of
those gifts are from individuals who want to see
the religious dimensions of college life strengthened.
If there are colleges and universities that
now seem to want to return to their heritages,
there are a goodly number that never left. I have
spent the last year writing a book about such col-

leges. As Senior Fellow in the Lilly Fellows Program for Humanities and the Arts-one of the
important projects of the Lilly Foundation-!
was given the opportunity to discern why and
how those colleges and universities have kept a
robust relation to their sponsoring traditions.
The finished product is tentatively entitled
Quality with Soul: Thriving Ventures in Christian Higher Education and should see the light
of day in late 2000 or early 2001 under the Eerdmans label.
The schools I visited and examined were
Calvin College, Wheaton College, St. Olaf College, Valparaiso University, Baylor University
and the University of Notre Dame. What is crucial about them, and sets them off from schools
with a looser relation to their sponsoring Christian heritages, is that they held and continue to
hold to the Christian tradition-as both vision
and ethos-as the organizing principle or paradigm of the school's life and mission. This seems
to be a banal or tautological statement, but it is
far from that. The vast majority of churchrelated colleges and universities allowed the
Enlightenment paradigm to displace the Christian tradition as the organizing principle. This
was understandable in light of the powerful
influence the Enlightenment had in the great
research universities that set the ideal about
what higher education was all about.
Autonomous reason-wedded to the scientific
method-was claimed by that Enlightenment
approach to be the sole trustworthy instrument
of truth. Religious claims to truth and goodness
were pushed to the margins of college and university life. Theology departments became religion departments that purported to understand
religious claims and phenomena through the
prism of Enlightenment reason itself.
But the six schools mentioned above were
not so easily intimidated by those powerful
Enlightenment assertions. Valparaiso continues
publicly to confess that "In Your Light We See
Light." St. Olaf conceives of its life and mission
as a Christian calling. Calvin College analyzes
the worldview assumptions in all secular claims
to knowledge, gives those claims a strong Christian critique and then integrates them into the
Christian worldview. Wheaton maintains a powerful evangelical ethos for its students and
recently has adapted-with some variations-

the Calvin model of faith/learning integration.
Baylor follows a similar trajectory as Wheaton.
Notre Dame maintains the Catholic ethos and
intellectual heritage as constitutive of its identity
and mission.
Why and how these six schools-as well a
quite a number of others-have been able to
keep their religious heritage publicly relevant to
all facets of their institutional existence is a long
story. I try to tell that story in detail in the larger
project. Suffice it to mention several necessities:
strong leaders within the church, the board of
trustees, administration and faculty have to
believe in the comprehensiveness, unsurpassability and centrality of the Christian account of
life and realty; those leaders have to be willing
to select enough persons of similar persuasion to
staff the school; they must collectively be willing
to make that Christian account effective in the
identity and mission of the school; and they
must be able to draw enough students who are
interested in such an enterprise. All that is easy
to say but difficult to do. But the six schools I
examined have all persisted in their commit-

ments to the public relevance of that Christian
account, some more confidently and solidly
than others.
There are many reasons to rejoice that
these schools have "kept the faith." These
church-related colleges and universities add real
pluralism to the homogenizing tendencies of
American higher education. They unabashedly
commend normative values to students in an
educational world that has few solid foundations
from which to commend anything. According to
research sponsored by the Lutheran Educational
Conference of North America, these sorts of
schools produce students whose civic, religious
and vocational values outshine those of students
from flagship public colleges and universities.
All this is praiseworthy. But the most compelling
reason for maintaining a robust relation to the
Christian heritage is that it is the right thing to
do. If Christian claims about life and reality are
true and good, they ought to have continuing
public relevance in those schools who maintain
strong connections to the traditions from
whence come those claims. f

ENCOUNTER
He had worked hard to hide inside his height,
to fill all the spaces made inside his clothes,
to make his face say nothing but the right thing,
which is nothing. He remained everything he was
the first time anyone met him-which was like
watching a building hold itself silently together.
Who could have guessed he had lost anything,
or had any reason for joy, or had gathered
anything to him other than his folded arms?

Jeffrey Shotts
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graduates, Wills is far from seeing
Augustine as a misogynist obsessed
with sex. His discussion of AugusFitzgerald, O.S.A., Allan D. (ed.). tine's relation with his unnamed
Augustine through the Ages: An "concubine" (whom Wills names
Encyclopedia. Grand Rapids, MI "Una") is both thoughtful and
and Cambridge, U.K.: William B. enlightening. He suspects that
Eerdmans, 1999.
Augustine's refusal to name her
"may have honored her own wish,"
Of the making of books about and he thinks it likely that she
St. Augustine there is-and should would have remained in corresponbe-no end. Still, among the many dence with their son, Adeodatus.
such books, the two reviewed Similarly, in one short paragraph
here-of vastly unequal length and Wills rather devastatingly dissects
detail-both deserve serious atten- accounts of Augustine's life that
tion.
depict him as excessively dependent
Garry Wills' brief biography upon or dominated by his mother
of Augustine appears in a new "Pen- Monica. Most important, Wills disguin Lives" series-all the volumes cusses the Pelagian controversy,
of which are handsomely produced which dominated Augustine's last
and blessedly brief. If Penguin's years, in such a way as to correct the
authors can produce many more picture so often given of Augustine
studies up to the standard Wills has as one peculiarly haunted by a sense
set, the series will surely have a long of the evil of sex. To the contrary,
life. Wills is perhaps generally as Wills notes, all participants in the
thought of as a cultural critic, but controversy "shared late-antique
he began his scholarly life as a clas- ideals of bodily denial remote from
sicist, and he brings to this book our mentality." And what was in
those linguistic skills. Although this fact original in Augustine's view,
short work cannot replace Peter what set him apart from earlier theBrown's magisterial and highly ologians, was "his claim that sex
readable biography, Augustine of would have occurred in Eden if
Hippo, it does a great deal in a short there had been no fall of man"-in
space. Wills' own reading of Augus- which case it could not possibly be
tine has clearly been influenced by an evil.
Brown (for example, in his treatMore important by far, Wills
ment of Augustine's views on reli- suggests, was Augustine's relation
gious coercion) and also by the vast to God. The young Augustine had
research of James O'Donnell (espe- been quite taken by the rhetoric of
cially upon the Confessions). But Cicero, swept off his feet by its
these are the scholars by whom one sophistication and drawn into the
ought to be influenced, and Wills' quest for philosophical wisdom. It
work certainly bears the marks of is no surprise, therefore, that this
his own independent assessment.
same Augustine (when drawn to
His life of Augustine follows a Manicheism) should have been
standard chronological order. repelled by the Old Testament writUnlike the way in which Augustine ings, which seemed to lack all that
is still sometimes taught to under- sophistication. As Wills puts it:
Wills, Garry. Saint Augustine. New
York: Viking Penguin, 1999.

"There was no dialoguing with
Yahveh. He did not explain his
demands to Job or Isaac. He was as
imperious and punitive as Augustine's own father." It was that
God-not some other whom he
might have preferred-whom
Augustine had to learn to love. And
yet, this God-obsessed Augustine is
far from rejecting the world. Again,
Wills sees more deeply. "Those who
think Augustine took a purely negative view of earthly realms should
reflect on the fact that the bishop,
in his late sixties, traveled 120 miles
from Hippo to meet with Boniface
in order to dissuade the count from
giving up power to become a
monk."
Wills' account of Augustine
the bishop's protracted conflict
with the Donatist churches is clear
and thoughtful. He captures nicely
Augustine's willingness to use any
means-other than, at first, forceto try to win back the schismatic
Donatists. Thus, he quotes several
verses from a Chant Answering the
Donatists-which chant, composed
by Augustine, consisted of 297
verses filled with mnemonic
devices, a kind of jingle. And,
without giving it his imprimatur,
Wills helps a reader understand
how Augustine was finally led to
support state coercion of the
Donatists. Augustine's own uneasiness about this led him to develop
something that was genuinely new:
a theory of suppression. "It is,"
Wills writes, "a sign of the general
acceptance of religious intolerance
that no one had felt the need to justify it.... But by putting his theory
in express terms, he bequeathed a
dangerous legacy to later ages. He,
not others, is looked back on as
the patron of repression-not

........__________________________
Ambrose, for instance, who prac- discusses both classical and Christised it far more extensively and tian influences upon Augustine and
heavyhandedly than Augustine ever his own immense influence upon
dreamed of doing."
those who followed him. Augustine
It is probably in his City of continues to be of importance not
God that Augustine comes most just for theologians but also for
directly and thoroughly to terms philosophers, historians, and politwith the classical world he had ical theorists, and the encyclopedia
inherited, but which was now will guide readers into topics as
dying. He demythologizes political important in Augustine's thought as
life, depriving it of any hint of love, memory, freedom of the will,
sacredness. ''According to Augus- war, time, and the relation of
tine, saints and sinners can live church and state. Thus, for
together precisely because they do example, one can read Kim Power's
not share an ultimate orientation entry on "Concubine/Concubitoward justice. What they have nage" to compare to Wills' treatinstead, in the criss-crossing of ment. Ann Matter's entry on
social ties, are sufficient concrete "women" is a model of scholarly
good things to protect and love in a care. Paula Fredriksen's entry on
joint way." Wills finds in this ''Apocalypticism" will help readers
analysis a kind of '"existential' to understand just how important
realism" that is more useful than Augustine has been in developing a
the procedural justice of post- reading of scripture that is historEnlightenment liberalism-or, at ical but not literal, an approach that
least, more useful if we want to was central in his reinterpretation
understand all societies and not just of earlier millenarian thought. Paul
Rigby's entry on "Original Sin" will
our own.
Wills has made certain autho- lead readers into the intricacies of
rial decisions that may seem a bit Augustine's influential thought on
"precious." Thus, he translates the a topic of vast complexity. And
"Confessions" as "The Testimony," there is much more.
Wills reminds us that as
gives the name of "Una" to Augustine's unnamed concubine, and Augustine lay dying he asked that
names Augustine's son "Godsent," large-lettered copies of the penitenwhich is indeed a literal translation tial psalms be placed around him on
of "Adeodatus," but which never- the walls of his monk's cell. He
theless rings a little strangely in our wanted to lament and repent of his
ears. Any of these decisions can be sins. And it is, Wills suggests
defended; at least the first of them
appropriate that he died surseems, on the whole, unwise. Quibrounded by the laboriously traced
bles apart, however, Wills has done
words
of Scripture. He had, all his
a great deal in a short space, and
life,
been
building a palace of
any reader of his book will be
words in which he lived, this
rewarded with new insights and a
antirhetorical rhetorician who yet
renewed appreciation for its
saw the divine Word reflected in
subject.
every word men speak or write
Anyone wanting to know
(or even mentally formulate), a
more than could possibly have been
man who loved words too well,
included in a short life of Augustine
perhaps, indulging them as they
can be confidently referred to
frisked from him in catchy ways,
curling back around and through
Augustine through the Ages. This
each other, carrying heavy loads
encyclopedia
carries
entries
of meaning at times, or else just
devoted in detail to the events of
bubbling up in self-indulgent
Augustine's life. It contains major
echoes
or assonance, yet reaching
entries on all his extant writings. It
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us-all those words, profound or
playful-with an extraordinary
immediacy, even today.

We can scarcely consider ourselves
educated until we have read some
of those words, and in service of
that end these two books will not
disappoint.
Gilbert Meilaender

Dorothy Bass. Receiving the Day:
Christian Practices for Opening the
Gift of Time. San Francisco: JosseyBass, 2000.
Christine D. Pohl. Making Room:
Recovering Hospitality as a Christian Tradition . Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.
Dorothy Bass is concerned not
with time management but with the
spiritual dimensions of living
within time. After introducing the
possibility of experiencing time as
God's gift in chapter one, she
devotes two chapters each to the
day, week, and year, and concludes
with a short chapter on our limited
lifetime.
Bass writes well: economically, concretely, and at a number of
points she weaves in her own experiences. The reader gets the sense of
connecting with a person, not just
a disembodied researcher. Her
emphasis throughout is on God's
grace. Time is God's gift and our
experience of it as such is also gift.
Bass is gentle with the reader, for
she recognizes that we live in an
efficient culture that does not value
taking time to be attentive to God,
others, our inner self, or nature and
she acknowledges that our circumstances vary. Yet she also suggests
ways to cultivate this attentiveness.
For instance, she says, "The Christian practice of receiving the day
begins with setting aside a part of
each day for attention to God"

(36). This requires saying no to
some other possibilities and often
involves a change in habits. One of
her suggestions for weekly mindfulness in keeping sabbath is to rest for
24 hours from shopping. Practices
associated with living through the
year are feasts and fasts connected
with seasons of the church year.
This is a fine book on a important topic. It is carefully crafted,
thoughtful, and invites the reader
to enter more deeply into receiving
God's gift of time.
Of course, there is always
more one might do, and perhaps in
the future Bass will delve further
into two issues which she identifies
in the book, but does not develop
much. One is that some people
experience time as empty and
boring; theirs is a very different
problem than being too busy. The
other issue is dealing with the
length of our lifetime. For those
with a very long lifetime, there may
be considerable overlap with the
emptiness of time. For those who
face an early death, their own or a
loved one's, the concerns are different. In her final chapter Bass
wisely points out that the people
who have much to teach us here are
those who have gone through this
struggle themselves, although there
is also a body of literature on this in
the Christian tradition. In any case,
Dorothy Bass has already given us a
valuable, substantial book.
Christine Pohl's Making
Room: Recovering Hospitality as a
Christian Tradition nicely complements the Bass book, for they both
acknowledge that hospitality relies
upon people's willingness to take
time for others. Pohl organizes her
discussion in three parts. Part one
traces the history of hospitality
from its biblical roots until today in
western culture. Hospitality is welcoming strangers, especially needy
strangers. While the household was
the chief locale of hospitality in
ancient times, gradually provision
for traveling strangers with means

has shifted to commercial enterprises, the "hospitality industry,"
and care for the needy has gone to
institutions with paid professionals
such as hospitals. In the process the
personal bonds between host and
guest are diminished, and personal
hospitality is frequently understood
as merely entertaining friends and
work associates. Pohl says recovering a deeper meaning of the practice will involve reclaiming both
household and church as sites for
hospitality.
Part two considers further
three aspects of hospitality: the
Christian theological grounds for
the fundamental attitude of recognition of the stranger, who the
diverse strangers in our midst are,
and the fact that those who practice
hospitality are commonly distanced
from important institutions and
possessions. In part three Pohl discusses some concrete ways in which
Christians might recover the practice of hospitality. She says that
boundaries need to be set in order
to protect both hosts and guest; for
instance, hosts should take time and
space to nurture themselves and
their family. In addition to making
a physical and metaphorical place
in home, church, and other settings,
those who practice hospitality need
to carry on spiritual practices such
as worship, prayer, and telling stories of hospitality which will sustain
them in a difficult ministry.
Christine Pohl has produced a
very worthwhile treatment of an
important spiritual practice. She
provides historical perspective,
honest acknowledgement of the
difficulties, and some concrete suggestions as she challenges readers to
be more hospitable. I found her
book particularly helpful in respect
to hospitality in the household and
intentional communities. Where I
wish she had done more is with the
congregation. While her original
research proposal was to cover both
congregations and intentional communities, she ended up visiting only

intentional communities since "few
[congregations] do it in a sufficiently intense and regular way to
surface the issues as effectively as
do those communities which provide hospitality full-time" (9). The
downside of this, though, is that the
book gives less help to congregations. Nevertheless, Christine Pohl
is to be thanked for the good work
she has done.
Bradley Hanson

Adriaan T. Pep~rzak. Reason in
Faith, On the Relevance of Christian Spirituality for Philosophy.
New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1999.
Adriaan Peperzak's Reason in
Faith, On the Relevance of Christian Spirituality for Philosophy is
neither an argumentative, expository, nor historical work. The word
that comes to mind is " primer." In
just over 15 0 pages it orients the
reader toward a specific characterization of the relationship between
religious faith and academic pursuits, in particular, philosophy. As
such, this book contributes to the
enduring conversation about how
faith and culture can or should be
related. Are they, for example, two
utterly unique languages, each
essentially inexpressible in the
terms of the other? Are they complements of one another? Are they
a mutual challenge to each other?
Answers to such questions are not
only of interest to those who think
of themselves as religiously faithful.
To the degree that faith is not an
entirely private affair, Athens itself
may be curious to know what
Jerusalem has to do with it. By
articulating a particular point of
view on this matter, Peperzak, professor of philosophy at Loyola University, sheds light broadly on issues
of faith and culture.
In the initial chapters of
Reason in Faith the reader is invited

to step back and recognize the
"bonds between philosophy and
science, on the one hand, and literature, spirituality, faith, etc., on the
other.... " (5) . The implication is
that philosophy has always had a
twofold lineage, and although its
parents frequently live apart, the
child loves both, and appropriately
so. The ambivalent, conflicted, or
simply ambiguous nature of this
bond with both science and literature, spirituality, faith, etc., suggests
that as philosophy becomes more
specialized something in its existential roots becomes overlooked.
What this overlooked something is
may be understood as "a thoughtful
quest for meaning" (9). The point
of returning to this original quest
for meaning "prior" to specialization clarifies the relation between
faith and academic pursuit, reason,
culture, etc., as a relation that is
internal to philosophy. This conclusion, if true, implies that further
specification of that relation, along
with its problems, is based on a
common denominator. Appealing
to such a common denominator,
Peperzak states that "no artist, scientist, or philosopher is without
faith" in the sense that these practitioners never proceed "without a
deeply rooted passion" (116). This
is the author's way of saying we all
must admit, as ordinary children of
the earth, that something drives our
academic pursuit before and
beyond the restrictions of particular disciplinary methods. Since the
advent of modernity these restrictions have frequently been summarized in the not only necessary but
sufficient criterion of reason,
"reason alone." We may detect in
this criterion a certain "faith in
reason" that Peperzak's title
encourages us to transpose, since
reason neither can nor should
operate alone.
It is not immediately clear
how this formal common denominator is informed by or related to
Christian spirituality. Early on in

the text Peperzak provides an
arguably Augustinian interpretation of the quest for meaning, using
the theme of desire. Desire, he
states, points beyond the satisfaction of "needs," which are listed
as "hygienic, social, aesthetic,
sporting, scientific, religious, [and]
financial. ... " (30). This implies a
restlessness within the human spirit
that cannot be quelled by any
particular, earthly object. The
emphasis that this restlessness
cannot be exhausted is seen in the
fact that Peperzak cites "religious"
among the local desires that
"Desire" itself looks beyond. But
this immediately provokes questions about the status of such a
desire. Did not Augustine, guided
by the hand of Ambrose and the
institution and practices his priestly
office represented, confess the rest
he found when he discovered the
Christian God as revealed in Scripture? In turn, this raises the more
general question whether aesthetic,
economic, familial, political and
churchly associations in fact provide the very content of a divinely
inspired life? Peperzak's answer to
this seems to be a Kierkegaardian
one: yes, but ambiguously, problematically, paradoxically.
The reason for this answer is
that authentic religiosity frequently
requires one to transcend and
expose the idolatry of "positive
religion," and in the process
involves one in forms of "skepsis
and atheism" (41). One could
agree, with Freud for example, that
the providential God of consolation is patently infantile. However,
this agreement with so eminent a
modern atheist could be religiously
motivated. Beyond the infantile
understanding of God, a theist
might recognize a truer, more adequate conception of God, a God
who, in the words of Paul Ricoeur,
"would not protect me but would
surrender me to the dangers of a life
worthy of being called human."
Contemporary Freudians,
m
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exchange, would thus be undogmatically encouraged to admit the
limitations of their own reductionistic methodology. This example
illustrates the sort of dialogue that
is possible between the religiously
faithful and the academically
critical.
In order to make such an
exchange possible Peperzak places
the accent on the critical aspect of
faith. "A Christian life begins in a
mixture of Christian faith, culture
and sin, in which faith is the critical
element that rejects sin by forbidding any absolutization of culture.
This rejection holds even if faith has
become tightly attached to its translation into a particular ethos or
doctrine" (119). When he turns to
state the matter positively, it is the
potentially universal aspects of the
Gospel that are presented as culturally relevant. "The charismata of
God's incarnation have been given
to many non-Christians before and
after Jesus' life. Examples of such
gifts can be found in the modern
declarations of human rights and
the legal treaties that issued from
them" (120). Such passages are one
more way to highlight the common
thread that runs through the text.
"The critical element that rejects
sin," in the form of culture or religious doctrine or both, is another
way to talk about the transcendent
terminus of religious desire. The
fact that the Gospel may announce
itself in a call for human rights is a
way to acknowledge the immanent
terms of that same desire. This is
enough to posit an initial complementarity between faith and the
academy.
Still, is there anything
uniquely Christian that a person of
faith has to offer? If this question
assumes the Christian worldview
contains something entirely set
apart from the world of culture,
irreducibly unique to the same
degree that it has specifiable content, then Peperzak's text leaves the
question suspended. The lineage of

all reflection is simply too common
for the problem to be posed in this
way. Nevertheless, I would suggest
that if the centerpiece of Christian
spiritual identity is the body and
blood of a particularly divine individual then its relevance for philosophy and culture generally could be
the following. In keeping with the
terms of Peperzak's analysis, the
claim of a perfect incarnation of
meaning would inspire one with as
much anxiety, as much restlessness,
as it does rest. This is most readily
seen in what has come to be known
as "the theology of the cross."
According to this theology, when
God is most present he is also most
absent. The divinity of his person
shines through a wretched, tragic
powerlessness. To preach Christ
crucified is to confess the fated

murder of a pacifist, in whose
remembrance all of his followers
sacramentally eat death, that is,
incorporate within themselves,
even and especially at their best, a
representative fragility. It is this
negative, critical, empty side of
Christian spirituality that forms the
link we may fruitfully make with
culture.
Let us be more specific by
drawing the kind of comparison
Peperzak would welcome. The treasure of human rights, to paraphrase
St. Paul, is also carried in earthen
vessels. Take the vessel of affirmative action. Is it not arguable that
we properly look upon this incarnation with double vision? However divine, however appropriate,
however good, affirmative action is
rather weak and poor and terribly

human. But that is precisely how we
are supposed to look upon Christ.
Spiritually educated in this way, one
would be trained to acknowledge
that any incarnate claim we are
inspired to make is more or less
paradoxical. And the more divine
the claim-that our marriages are
the incarnation of love, our universities the incarnation of learning,
our nation the incarnation of
democracy-the more paradoxical
it is, the more fully realized and
fully empty it becomes. If it is this
unabbreviated Good Friday that
informs one's spiritual identity,
then Christians can count themselves among those most prepared
for a more universal, more fully
human cultural adventure.
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